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Downloaded from
YTS.MX

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(ominous music)

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Official YIFY movies site:
YTS.MX

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(engine rumbles)

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(crowd cheers)

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(crowd cheers)

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(bell rings)

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(airplane roars past)

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(siren rings)

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(airplane roars)

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(loud explosions)

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(army marches)

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(siren rings)
(ominous boom)

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(suspenseful music)

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- [Narrator] This is the terrifying story

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of the titanic duel fought

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between the armies of Hitler
and Stalin in the bitter cold

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of an Arctic winter outside Leningrad.

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It was here that the men of
the German Army Group North

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fought and died with
the men of the Red Army.

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The German forces were so
constantly short of manpower

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and material, that they
christened the pitiless war

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they were fighting, "The
eternal war of the poor man".

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(series of explosions)

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The Russians too, had to
endure terrible hardship.

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And the siege of Leningrad
contains heartrending tales

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of suffering and heroism,

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but the Russian sacrifice was
ultimately to be vindicated.

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For the men of Army Group North

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there was to be no such satisfaction.

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Most were destined never
to return to Germany.

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The ceaseless demands of the
cruelest conflict in history

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would ultimately claim the
whole Army Group as its victim.

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(ominous music)

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In late 1940

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when Adolf Hitler finally
confirmed to the general staff

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that he had irrevocably
decided to attack Russia,

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a plan was swiftly
conceived by General Marcks

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which envisaged a two pronged
advance by two huge army

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groups totaling over 3,500,000 men.

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The German grand strategy

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was for two great parallel advances.

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The first aimed at Leningrad in the North,

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then swinging South to Moscow.

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And the second at Odesa on the black sea.

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(ominous music)

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During the winter of 1939,

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Finland had been involved in
an uneven struggle with Soviet

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Russia to protect her territory.

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Under the leadership of
field marshal Mannerheim

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the Fins had doggedly resisted

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the superior Russian forces,

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but ultimately had to yield

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valuable territory around Leningrad.

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Britain had refused to
help the Fins who in 1941,

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turned to Germany for aid in
regaining their lost territory.

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Hitler hoped to draw Finland

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into an offensive war with Russia,

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but the finish objective was
simply to address the balance,

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not the conquest of Russia.

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Although the Fins would play a small part

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in the battle for Leningrad,

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their refusal to mount an
invasion of Soviet territory

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would ultimately have dire
consequences for Hitler.

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(ominous music)

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Under the Marcks plan,

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elements of Army Group North,

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were to capture Leningrad,

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then drive North to link up with the Fins

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and eliminate all Russian forces

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in the Baltic region.

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Only then was Moscow to be attacked

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from the West and North simultaneously.

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(ominous music)

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From the very outset

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Hitler found it impossible to prioritize

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the objectives for his Russian campaign.

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After much discussion and argument,

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the Marcks plan was subsequently
revised to produce three

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separate army groups.

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Each aimed at a different objective.

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Army Group North was to capture Leningrad,

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Army Group Center was to capture Moscow

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and Army Group South was aimed at Odesa.

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With three major objectives to achieve

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it was clear from the
outset that German forces

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would be dangerously overstretched.

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Sections of the German military

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were very opposed to the venture,

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but Hitler refused to accept

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the advice of his staff officers.

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His gamblers instinct told
him that if he delayed

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even for one year,

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the crowds that cheered
the latest successes

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so fervently, might no longer
be willing to follow him into

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so hazardous an undertaking.

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And there was surely no
greater military adventure

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than the invasion of Russia.

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(ominous music)

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(building explodes)

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(loud boom)

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Following the spectacular
victories in Poland, Norway,

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France and the Balkans,

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the German forces assembled for
Barbarossa expected to fight

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a short campaign,

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which would secure their
victories throughout Europe.

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Hitler became convinced that
he could crush the Red Army

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as easily as he had
defeated his other enemies.

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In the spring of 1941

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field marshal von Rundstedt,

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who had spent most of the first world war

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on the Eastern front,
asked Hitler outright

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if he knew what it meant to invade Russia.

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The commander in chief,
field marshal von Brauchitsch

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and his chief of the
general staff general Halder

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also counseled Hitler
against the operation.

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It was all to no avail

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as Hitler simply refused
to heed their warnings.

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Field Marshall von Rundstedt,

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the commander of Army Group South

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was forthright in his views
on the forthcoming battle.

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"This war with Russia
is a nonsensical idea

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to which I can see no happy ending.

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But if for political reasons,

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the war is unavoidable,

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then we must face the
fact that it cannot be won

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in a single summer campaign.

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Just look at the distances involved.

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We cannot possibly defeat the
enemy and occupy the whole

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of Western Russia from the
Baltic to the black sea

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within a few short months.

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We should prepare for a long war

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and go for our objectives step by step.

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First of all,

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a strong Army Group North
should capture Leningrad

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and the area around it.

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This would enable us to
link up with the Fins,

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eliminate the red fleet
from the Baltic and increase

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our influence in Scandinavia.

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The central and Southern
army groups should

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for the time being

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advance only to align running Odesa, Kiev,

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Orsha, Lake Ilmen.

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Then if we have sufficient time this year

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Army Group North could advance Southeast

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from Leningrad towards Moscow
while Army Group Center

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move eastwards on the capital.

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All further operations should
be postponed until 1942,

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when we should make new
plans based on the situation

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as it then is."

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Had Hitler followed von
Rundstedt's good advice,

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the history of the Western
world may well have followed

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a very different pattern.

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Hitler, however, did have good grounds

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for rejecting the advice of his officers.

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(ominous music)

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While the German army in
the 1930s had been building

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its strength under Hitler,

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Stalin had been destroying
the Russian officer Corps.

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By the end of the purge,

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the Russian army had lost
three of the five remaining

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marshals of the Soviet union,

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all 11 deputy ministers of defense,

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75 of the 80 members
of the military Soviet,

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all the commanders of
the military districts,

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13 of the 15 army commanders,

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more than half the Corps commanders

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and approximately 30% of the officers

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below brigade level.

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Stalin had considered himself safe

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as he did not intend to become
involved in Western affairs.

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He had made complex peace treaties

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and alliances with both
Britain and Germany

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and hoped they would fight
a mutually destructive war

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in the West.

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(suspenseful music)

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Less than one year later, however,

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Stalin's hopes of a protracted
war between the Western

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powers and Hitler, evaporated
with the brilliant success

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of Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics,
which saw Denmark, Norway,

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Holland, Belgium, and France
fall in rapid succession.

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The lightning campaign through
the Balkans in Greece in 1941

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could only produce more
grounds for disquiet.

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Though Stalin accepted
that war with Germany

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was now almost inevitable,

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he certainly did not expect
to be attacked in 1941.

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He decided Russia had at
least until the spring of 1942

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to prepare herself.

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His explosive denials of all contrary

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information was so fierce that
vital intelligence concerning

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German preparations was kept
from him by subordinates

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fearful of the violence of his temper.

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As the German buildup towards
operation Barbarossa continued

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Stalin's attempts to pacify
Hitler grew more desperate.

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He had already stated in
an interview with Pravda

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in November 1939,

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that it was not Germany who had
attacked Britain and France,

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but Britain and France
who had attacked Germany.

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Stalin now forbade

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any criticism of Germany to
be printed in the newspapers.

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In 1940, he increased Russian supplies

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to Germany and withdrew

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recognition of the Norwegian

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and Belgian governments in exile.

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In the following year

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when Hitler successfully invaded

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Greece and Yugoslavia,
Stalin quickly expelled

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the Yugoslavian ambassador

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to Moscow and refused a request

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to recognize the Greek
government in exile.

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Stalin felt he was continuing
to buy time with these

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unrequited concessions, but
his use of the breathing space,

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which he had already obtained
was totally devoid of any

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worthwhile attempt to remedy
his military disadvantages.

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(ominous music)

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(slow suspenseful music)

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The main Russian force charged
with defending Leningrad

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was the Northwest Front under Kuznetsov.

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In theory, the Russian forces

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were larger and more generously supplied

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with tanks, guns, and aircraft.

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In practice, the Red Army as a whole

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proved to be so demoralized by

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internal disruptions that they
were disastrously unprepared.

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In addition, much of the Russian equipment

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was obsolete or unserviceable

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with the result that in the
opening battles at least,

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there was to be no real contest.

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As a result of Stalin's purges,

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the Soviet forces were
less than equal to the task

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of combating a highly
professional, well organized army,

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which was accustomed to
success on the battlefield.

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(melancholy music)

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Many divisions where between
six to 7,000 men short

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of wartime establishment.

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Levies of experienced personnel
had been hived off to build

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new tank and aviation units.

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Only one of the six Soviet
mechanized Corps had received

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their full compliment of equipment.

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Three of the four motorized divisions

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had no tanks whatsoever.

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And four out of every five vehicles

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in the tank fleets were obsolete.

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Four of the Corps could only
deploy one quarter of their

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designated motor vehicles.

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And in another four Corps

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one in three motor
vehicles needed repairs.

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From even a cursory analysis,

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the Soviet Red Army and
the German Wehrmacht

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were anything but equal adversaries.

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(man speaks over radio)

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(loud explosions)

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In the Western part of Russia,

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the Red Army consisted
of about 5,000,000 men

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with 1,000,000 in the Leningrad sector.

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Although the tank strength of the Red Army

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on the 21st of June, 1941 was
an impressive 23,108 machines,

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only 8,000 were battle
ready and in good condition.

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Of these, less than 1200 were deployed

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in the Leningrad sector.

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Many of the Soviet tanks
where the outdated T26

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and T28 medium tanks,

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there were even a few of
the outdated T35 machines,

264
00:15:13,940 --> 00:15:16,190
a massive multi turreted tank,

265
00:15:16,190 --> 00:15:19,023
which proved to be a
disastrous failure in action.

266
00:15:22,132 --> 00:15:24,799
(ominous music)

267
00:15:31,710 --> 00:15:33,620
In June, 1941

268
00:15:33,620 --> 00:15:35,760
the time of the German attack,

269
00:15:35,760 --> 00:15:37,400
Army Group North was commanded

270
00:15:37,400 --> 00:15:39,810
by field Marshall Ritter Von Leeb

271
00:15:39,810 --> 00:15:42,690
and was composed of two subsidiary armies.

272
00:15:42,690 --> 00:15:46,710
The 16th army, initially
commanded by field Marshall Busch

273
00:15:46,710 --> 00:15:49,863
and the 18th army commanded
by general Von Kuchler.

274
00:15:51,240 --> 00:15:53,250
For the initial thrust into Russia

275
00:15:53,250 --> 00:15:55,300
under the Barbarossa directive

276
00:15:55,300 --> 00:15:57,250
Army Group North enjoyed the support

277
00:15:57,250 --> 00:15:59,370
of a powerful tank force

278
00:15:59,370 --> 00:16:02,540
designed as Panzer Group
IV under the leadership

279
00:16:02,540 --> 00:16:03,623
of general Hoepner.

280
00:16:04,600 --> 00:16:07,180
For air support Army
Group North could call

281
00:16:07,180 --> 00:16:10,423
upon Luftflotte One,
commanded by general Keller.

282
00:16:11,330 --> 00:16:12,820
The Stukas of Luftflotte One

283
00:16:12,820 --> 00:16:15,090
were to provide the flying artillery

284
00:16:15,090 --> 00:16:17,553
for the lightning attack
of the 22nd of June.

285
00:16:20,680 --> 00:16:23,640
Naval support was available
from the powerful battle group

286
00:16:23,640 --> 00:16:26,720
North under the command of Admiral Carls,

287
00:16:26,720 --> 00:16:28,330
who set about planning the campaign

288
00:16:28,330 --> 00:16:29,763
with his senior commanders.

289
00:16:38,040 --> 00:16:40,350
As commander of Army Group North

290
00:16:40,350 --> 00:16:42,960
Von Leeb had excellent credibility.

291
00:16:42,960 --> 00:16:46,070
He had formerly commanded
the German Army Group center,

292
00:16:46,070 --> 00:16:48,080
which had succeeded
brilliantly in the attack

293
00:16:48,080 --> 00:16:50,580
on France in 1940.

294
00:16:50,580 --> 00:16:53,300
He was extremely well-supported
by some of the most capable

295
00:16:53,300 --> 00:16:55,813
commanders the German
army had in its ranks.

296
00:17:13,480 --> 00:17:15,840
As the German officers could
draw on the experiences

297
00:17:15,840 --> 00:17:19,430
of the war in Poland, France,
Norway, and the Balkans,

298
00:17:19,430 --> 00:17:21,970
the quality of their
commanders was always likely

299
00:17:21,970 --> 00:17:23,920
to be superior to that of the Russians.

300
00:17:30,251 --> 00:17:32,918
(ominous music)

301
00:17:40,240 --> 00:17:42,210
For the great assault on Russia,

302
00:17:42,210 --> 00:17:43,500
Army Group North could count

303
00:17:43,500 --> 00:17:47,510
on over 800,000 men and 800 tanks

304
00:17:47,510 --> 00:17:50,440
organized into three armored divisions,

305
00:17:50,440 --> 00:17:53,300
three motorized infantry divisions,

306
00:17:53,300 --> 00:17:57,721
20 infantry divisions, and
three security divisions.

307
00:17:57,721 --> 00:17:59,447
(Hitler yells)

308
00:17:59,447 --> 00:18:01,200
(soldiers singing)

309
00:18:01,200 --> 00:18:04,090
Army group North was by no
means the armored juggernaut

310
00:18:04,090 --> 00:18:05,980
of popular mythology.

311
00:18:05,980 --> 00:18:08,180
Four-fifths of the soldiers had to walk

312
00:18:08,180 --> 00:18:10,810
into battle like the soldiers of Napoleon

313
00:18:10,810 --> 00:18:12,634
over a century earlier.

314
00:18:12,634 --> 00:18:15,801
(upbeat German music)

315
00:18:20,030 --> 00:18:22,450
In 1941, the mechanized era

316
00:18:22,450 --> 00:18:24,170
was still in its infancy

317
00:18:24,170 --> 00:18:25,210
and Army Group North

318
00:18:25,210 --> 00:18:29,903
needed 200,000 horses to draw
their guns and equipment.

319
00:18:29,903 --> 00:18:32,820
(German war music)

320
00:18:40,030 --> 00:18:43,170
The Army Group could deploy 1200 guns

321
00:18:43,170 --> 00:18:45,150
in terms of tanks and aircraft,

322
00:18:45,150 --> 00:18:50,150
Army Group North could boasts
600 tanks and 430 aircraft.

323
00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:52,970
Most of them superior to the Russian tanks

324
00:18:52,970 --> 00:18:54,953
and all of them in better condition.

325
00:18:57,100 --> 00:18:59,770
Army Group North tends to
be treated in some respects

326
00:18:59,770 --> 00:19:00,990
as the poor relation

327
00:19:00,990 --> 00:19:04,260
compared to Army Group
South and army group Center.

328
00:19:04,260 --> 00:19:06,890
But initially, although
there were fewer formations

329
00:19:06,890 --> 00:19:08,140
of Army Group North,

330
00:19:08,140 --> 00:19:10,380
they actually achieved
their initial objectives

331
00:19:10,380 --> 00:19:12,760
with great skill and speed.

332
00:19:12,760 --> 00:19:15,677
(vehicle explodes)

333
00:19:17,635 --> 00:19:20,385
(engine rumbles)

334
00:19:22,880 --> 00:19:25,213
(gun fires)

335
00:19:28,487 --> 00:19:30,904
(loud blast)

336
00:19:32,380 --> 00:19:35,260
Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign
minister had successfully

337
00:19:35,260 --> 00:19:36,960
concluded a non-aggression pact

338
00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:39,723
between Germany and Russia in 1940.

339
00:19:40,590 --> 00:19:42,830
Nevertheless, Stalin was wise enough

340
00:19:42,830 --> 00:19:44,690
to remain wary of his sinister

341
00:19:44,690 --> 00:19:46,760
neighbors to the West.

342
00:19:46,760 --> 00:19:49,030
Stalin's overall military strategy

343
00:19:49,030 --> 00:19:52,330
required the expansion of Soviet
territory to create a deep

344
00:19:52,330 --> 00:19:56,200
barrier of Russian held territory
between the Soviet union

345
00:19:56,200 --> 00:19:57,563
and Nazi Germany.

346
00:19:58,420 --> 00:20:00,760
It was this consideration
which had led Stalin

347
00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:03,483
to collaborate with Hitler
in the invasion of Poland.

348
00:20:07,860 --> 00:20:10,330
Ironically, the secret negotiations

349
00:20:10,330 --> 00:20:12,650
instigated by Germany had also

350
00:20:12,650 --> 00:20:16,000
granted Stalin the freehand
in the Baltic and Finland,

351
00:20:16,000 --> 00:20:17,780
which had precipitated the winter war,

352
00:20:17,780 --> 00:20:20,353
which the Fins were now so keen to avenge.

353
00:20:24,750 --> 00:20:27,220
From behind this defensive wall

354
00:20:27,220 --> 00:20:29,390
Stalin planed to allow the Western allies

355
00:20:29,390 --> 00:20:33,220
and Germany to fight a mutually
destructive war in the West,

356
00:20:33,220 --> 00:20:35,870
as they had done for four
years during the great war.

357
00:20:38,184 --> 00:20:42,101
(series of distant explosions)

358
00:21:02,897 --> 00:21:05,564
(ominous music)

359
00:21:14,830 --> 00:21:18,430
The early war Russian fighters
were already obsolete.

360
00:21:18,430 --> 00:21:21,890
Aircraft such as the Polikarpov I153

361
00:21:21,890 --> 00:21:23,850
a lumbering biplane,

362
00:21:23,850 --> 00:21:27,610
and the Polikarpov I16 known
as the ratter were easily

363
00:21:27,610 --> 00:21:30,673
outclassed by the new
generation of German fighters.

364
00:21:34,930 --> 00:21:38,270
These included the German
Messerschmitt 109 fighters,

365
00:21:38,270 --> 00:21:41,270
which were faster and more
maneuverable than anything

366
00:21:41,270 --> 00:21:43,300
the Russians could throw against them.

367
00:21:53,760 --> 00:21:56,093
(loud boom)

368
00:22:00,373 --> 00:22:03,040
(ominous music)

369
00:22:14,230 --> 00:22:19,010
At last, at 04:00 on
the 22nd of June, 1941,

370
00:22:19,010 --> 00:22:22,790
the code word "Dortmund"
crackled down the wires

371
00:22:22,790 --> 00:22:25,600
and the full force of
operation Barbarossa,

372
00:22:25,600 --> 00:22:28,473
Germany's invasion of Soviet
Russia, was unleashed.

373
00:22:30,525 --> 00:22:32,157
(airplane roars)

374
00:22:32,157 --> 00:22:34,907
(loud explosion)

375
00:22:43,270 --> 00:22:45,130
AS they had come to expect

376
00:22:45,130 --> 00:22:46,670
the German army sliced through

377
00:22:46,670 --> 00:22:48,643
the opposition on the way to Leningrad.

378
00:22:49,530 --> 00:22:51,610
Faced by the result of his own failures

379
00:22:51,610 --> 00:22:54,900
in military matters, Stalin panicked.

380
00:22:54,900 --> 00:22:56,630
While his army headquarters desperately

381
00:22:56,630 --> 00:22:58,740
tried to piece together
the most rudimentary

382
00:22:58,740 --> 00:23:00,530
picture of what was happening,

383
00:23:00,530 --> 00:23:03,923
he ordered an immediate counter
offensive on all fronts.

384
00:23:04,780 --> 00:23:06,810
As the first reports of the devastation

385
00:23:06,810 --> 00:23:09,390
he had helped to create filtered through,

386
00:23:09,390 --> 00:23:10,983
he was close to breaking point.

387
00:23:14,467 --> 00:23:17,790
"All that Lennon created,
we have lost forever",

388
00:23:17,790 --> 00:23:22,240
he declared, before retreating
to his dacha not to emerge

389
00:23:22,240 --> 00:23:23,973
until the 3rd of July.

390
00:23:29,180 --> 00:23:32,070
What really stunned the Red
Army commanders was that this

391
00:23:32,070 --> 00:23:35,350
massive German assault had
proceeded long after it had left

392
00:23:35,350 --> 00:23:38,360
its artillery support behind.

393
00:23:38,360 --> 00:23:40,020
The Red Army command had planned

394
00:23:40,020 --> 00:23:44,550
for conventional meeting
engagements and frontline battles.

395
00:23:44,550 --> 00:23:46,810
The perceived wisdom was
that these would develop

396
00:23:46,810 --> 00:23:49,560
over days or even weeks.

397
00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:53,000
Next would come a large
series of complex engagements.

398
00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:55,523
And then the real war would begin.

399
00:23:56,550 --> 00:23:59,920
In reality, using the
new Blitzkrieg tactics,

400
00:23:59,920 --> 00:24:03,080
the German advance was so
swift that within hours of

401
00:24:03,080 --> 00:24:04,750
the launch of Barbarossa

402
00:24:04,750 --> 00:24:07,210
tank columns from Panzer Group IV were

403
00:24:07,210 --> 00:24:11,183
approaching Riga some 50
miles behind the front.

404
00:24:15,540 --> 00:24:18,060
This extended Blitzkrieg technique,

405
00:24:18,060 --> 00:24:21,350
especially the bold use of
armor came as an extraordinary

406
00:24:21,350 --> 00:24:24,070
and disorientating
surprise to the Russians,

407
00:24:24,070 --> 00:24:26,273
even to the senior Soviet commanders.

408
00:24:36,220 --> 00:24:37,740
Within 48 hours,

409
00:24:37,740 --> 00:24:40,150
general staff reports
made it perfectly plain,

410
00:24:40,150 --> 00:24:42,463
that they had lost
control of the situation.

411
00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:45,420
They were in complete chaos,

412
00:24:45,420 --> 00:24:48,140
and many did not know
where their troops were

413
00:24:48,140 --> 00:24:49,333
or what was happening.

414
00:24:52,020 --> 00:24:54,730
They certainly did not have
accurate reports of German

415
00:24:54,730 --> 00:24:58,100
movements, and there was
no real intelligence.

416
00:24:58,100 --> 00:24:59,350
So they were not even sure

417
00:24:59,350 --> 00:25:01,950
where the German thrusts were aimed.

418
00:25:01,950 --> 00:25:04,550
All that they did know
was that in the Northwest,

419
00:25:04,550 --> 00:25:06,680
there was total collapse.

420
00:25:06,680 --> 00:25:10,450
In consequence, Stalin
operated his usual practice.

421
00:25:10,450 --> 00:25:14,120
He had most of the front
commanders arrested and then shot

422
00:25:16,620 --> 00:25:18,350
as a consequence of the confusion

423
00:25:18,350 --> 00:25:20,310
which raged throughout the army,

424
00:25:20,310 --> 00:25:23,400
many of the Red Army
divisions simply broke up

425
00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:24,950
and formed very large pockets

426
00:25:24,950 --> 00:25:26,273
of leaderless troops.

427
00:25:27,280 --> 00:25:28,400
Passing these groups

428
00:25:28,400 --> 00:25:31,880
of disorientated men, Von
Leeb's Army Group North

429
00:25:31,880 --> 00:25:35,520
scythed into the Baltic
States, capturing Riga,

430
00:25:35,520 --> 00:25:37,428
the Latvian capital.

431
00:25:37,428 --> 00:25:40,428
(suspenseful music)

432
00:25:57,553 --> 00:26:00,303
(loud explosion)

433
00:26:02,040 --> 00:26:05,340
The number of prisoners taken
and the war material captured

434
00:26:05,340 --> 00:26:07,730
or destroyed in operation Barbarossa

435
00:26:07,730 --> 00:26:10,830
was assuming astronomical proportions.

436
00:26:10,830 --> 00:26:13,830
It is hardly surprising
that Hitler, his commanders

437
00:26:13,830 --> 00:26:15,290
and the troops themselves

438
00:26:15,290 --> 00:26:16,800
now believed that the Red Army

439
00:26:16,800 --> 00:26:19,150
must be nearing the end of its resources,

440
00:26:19,150 --> 00:26:21,613
both in manpower and in weapons.

441
00:26:22,540 --> 00:26:24,480
Prisoners confess that the German attack

442
00:26:24,480 --> 00:26:26,870
had been completely unexpected.

443
00:26:26,870 --> 00:26:31,053
Moscow, it seemed, was certain
to fall into German hands.

444
00:26:32,100 --> 00:26:34,683
Great optimism prevailed
in Army Group Center.

445
00:26:35,640 --> 00:26:39,110
Hitler had already set up
a special engineer command

446
00:26:39,110 --> 00:26:41,733
whose task was to be the
demolition of the Kremlin.

447
00:26:45,460 --> 00:26:48,090
The propaganda ministry
saw fit to make a bombastic

448
00:26:48,090 --> 00:26:51,580
statement announcing that
the war in the East was won

449
00:26:51,580 --> 00:26:54,355
and the Red Army practically annihilated.

450
00:26:54,355 --> 00:26:58,050
(German leader gives speech)

451
00:26:58,050 --> 00:27:00,510
During the early stages of the campaign,

452
00:27:00,510 --> 00:27:03,130
the Stuka dive bombers of Luftflotte One

453
00:27:03,130 --> 00:27:04,630
played their familiar role

454
00:27:04,630 --> 00:27:07,830
as the German storm broke against Russia.

455
00:27:07,830 --> 00:27:11,360
The initial moves followed the
classic Blitzkrieg pattern,

456
00:27:11,360 --> 00:27:14,770
no declaration of war
and a fast moving assault

457
00:27:14,770 --> 00:27:17,783
designed to disorientate and
confuse the Russian army.

458
00:27:20,350 --> 00:27:22,860
As the forces of Army
Group North drove further

459
00:27:22,860 --> 00:27:24,430
into the Baltic States,

460
00:27:24,430 --> 00:27:27,163
Latvia and Estonia were quickly captured.

461
00:27:34,020 --> 00:27:35,640
These lightning advances were greeted

462
00:27:35,640 --> 00:27:38,620
with joy by the citizens
of cities like Riga,

463
00:27:38,620 --> 00:27:41,743
where the population viewed the
German armies as liberators.

464
00:28:06,400 --> 00:28:08,400
In scenes of unprompted joy,

465
00:28:08,400 --> 00:28:10,990
the German soldiers were
greeted with flowers and kisses

466
00:28:10,990 --> 00:28:12,040
from the local girls.

467
00:28:42,310 --> 00:28:45,070
A great deal of the Naval
effort throughout the campaign

468
00:28:45,070 --> 00:28:47,900
lay in suppressing Soviet Naval activity

469
00:28:47,900 --> 00:28:50,290
by laying thousands of mines,

470
00:28:50,290 --> 00:28:52,010
a task, which continued

471
00:28:52,010 --> 00:28:54,493
even in the face of fierce air resistance.

472
00:29:01,585 --> 00:29:04,570
(rapid gunfire)

473
00:29:04,570 --> 00:29:06,910
These ships of Carl's battle group

474
00:29:06,910 --> 00:29:08,120
continued with the task

475
00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:11,483
of mine laying, despite the
attentions of the red air force.

476
00:29:20,340 --> 00:29:23,290
On land, the presence of
a strong armored force

477
00:29:23,290 --> 00:29:25,348
in the form of Panzer Group IV

478
00:29:25,348 --> 00:29:28,320
gave Army Group North some
much needed tank support

479
00:29:28,320 --> 00:29:30,320
during the headlong advance into Russia.

480
00:29:31,260 --> 00:29:33,720
Nevertheless, the rudimentary road system

481
00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:34,760
of the Baltic States

482
00:29:34,760 --> 00:29:37,683
and Northern Russia played
havoc with the tanks.

483
00:29:38,990 --> 00:29:41,330
Right at the beginning
of the Russian campaign,

484
00:29:41,330 --> 00:29:44,610
the Germans experienced the
problems which dust can cause

485
00:29:44,610 --> 00:29:46,340
in motor vehicles.

486
00:29:46,340 --> 00:29:48,840
Tanks sustained severe
damage from the dust

487
00:29:48,840 --> 00:29:52,310
they stirred up while
crossing vast sandy regions,

488
00:29:52,310 --> 00:29:55,630
many tanks had no dust filters
and on those which were

489
00:29:55,630 --> 00:29:59,520
equipped, the filters soon
became thoroughly clogged.

490
00:29:59,520 --> 00:30:01,990
Quartz dust was sucked into engines,

491
00:30:01,990 --> 00:30:05,200
which became so ground out
that many tanks were rendered

492
00:30:05,200 --> 00:30:08,010
unserviceable, in other tanks,

493
00:30:08,010 --> 00:30:11,570
the abrasive action of dust
reduced engine efficiency

494
00:30:11,570 --> 00:30:13,923
and massively increased fuel consumption.

495
00:30:16,710 --> 00:30:20,120
The sand roads undoubtedly
caused problems.

496
00:30:20,120 --> 00:30:23,260
They greatly slowed tanks or trucks.

497
00:30:23,260 --> 00:30:25,400
They also caused huge dust clouds,

498
00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:27,083
which were raised by convoys.

499
00:30:28,220 --> 00:30:30,940
These dust clouds frequently
provoked air attacks

500
00:30:30,940 --> 00:30:33,393
by the surviving aircraft
of the red air force.

501
00:30:34,300 --> 00:30:36,900
As the red air force
re-gathered its strength,

502
00:30:36,900 --> 00:30:39,890
these attacks resulted
in serious losses of men,

503
00:30:39,890 --> 00:30:41,783
vehicles and horses.

504
00:30:49,350 --> 00:30:52,060
For as long as they were in
support of Army Group North,

505
00:30:52,060 --> 00:30:55,880
the tanks of Panzer Group IV
played an invaluable role,

506
00:30:55,880 --> 00:30:57,470
but even with the Panzers,

507
00:30:57,470 --> 00:31:01,050
the swift advances of June and
July ground to a halt against

508
00:31:01,050 --> 00:31:03,390
the tough defenses of the Stalin line,

509
00:31:03,390 --> 00:31:06,203
which were encountered in
August and early September.

510
00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:10,720
While the fortifications of the
frontier districts left much

511
00:31:10,720 --> 00:31:12,030
to be desired,

512
00:31:12,030 --> 00:31:15,130
there were still extensive
fortifications to be overcome

513
00:31:15,130 --> 00:31:16,673
deep within mother Russia.

514
00:31:17,700 --> 00:31:20,260
Although they did not
form a solid unbroken line

515
00:31:20,260 --> 00:31:23,410
of fortifications, like
the French Maggiano line,

516
00:31:23,410 --> 00:31:26,900
the heavily defended Stalin
line or the Leningrad line

517
00:31:26,900 --> 00:31:29,270
as the German forces in the North knew it,

518
00:31:29,270 --> 00:31:32,073
was a formidable series
of prepared defenses.

519
00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:35,350
Areas of great importance were

520
00:31:35,350 --> 00:31:38,810
surrounded with heavy fortifications
and the German armored

521
00:31:38,810 --> 00:31:42,030
units driving for Leningrad
encountered fortification

522
00:31:42,030 --> 00:31:44,780
systems up to six miles in depth,

523
00:31:44,780 --> 00:31:48,060
including well-positioned
earth and concrete bunkers

524
00:31:48,060 --> 00:31:50,493
with built-in guns and
other heavy weapons.

525
00:31:51,410 --> 00:31:54,710
There were also concrete
pillboxes with disappearing

526
00:31:54,710 --> 00:31:57,693
armored cupolas for
artillery and machine guns.

527
00:31:58,940 --> 00:32:02,200
A speedy elimination of these
strong defenses with the means

528
00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:05,300
available to a force
designed for mobile warfare

529
00:32:05,300 --> 00:32:06,853
was extremely difficult.

530
00:32:07,774 --> 00:32:10,774
(suspenseful music)

531
00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:22,390
The area of Krasnogvardeysk,

532
00:32:22,390 --> 00:32:24,950
South of Leningrad, had been developed

533
00:32:24,950 --> 00:32:27,970
according to sound soviet
defensive principles,

534
00:32:27,970 --> 00:32:30,580
and was effectively turned
into an outlying fortress

535
00:32:30,580 --> 00:32:32,153
for the defensive Leningrad.

536
00:32:33,030 --> 00:32:35,670
During early September, 1941

537
00:32:35,670 --> 00:32:37,220
it presented great difficulties

538
00:32:37,220 --> 00:32:39,263
to the advance of the German forces.

539
00:32:42,610 --> 00:32:46,150
Krasnogvardeysk blocked all
highways and railroads leading

540
00:32:46,150 --> 00:32:48,300
to Leningrad from the South

541
00:32:48,300 --> 00:32:51,940
and constituted the main
bulwark of Russian resistance.

542
00:32:51,940 --> 00:32:54,800
The Russians defended it persistently.

543
00:32:54,800 --> 00:32:56,430
Repeated attacks by several

544
00:32:56,430 --> 00:32:58,980
infantry divisions were repulsed.

545
00:32:58,980 --> 00:33:01,330
It was only taken in the
course of a general attack

546
00:33:01,330 --> 00:33:02,920
on the Leningrad line

547
00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:05,380
and after bitter pillbox
fighting in the area

548
00:33:05,380 --> 00:33:08,157
immediately surrounding Krasnogvardeysk.

549
00:33:09,013 --> 00:33:12,013
(suspenseful music)

550
00:33:26,950 --> 00:33:30,580
Only the flexible leadership
of battle-tested armored forces

551
00:33:30,580 --> 00:33:32,280
attacking with great vigor

552
00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:34,960
made it possible to
overcome the defense zones

553
00:33:34,960 --> 00:33:36,910
which had been set up
with a sound knowledge

554
00:33:36,910 --> 00:33:38,783
of the latest defense techniques.

555
00:33:39,830 --> 00:33:42,980
Within a week, the German
sixth Panzer division

556
00:33:42,980 --> 00:33:44,130
had been forced to break

557
00:33:44,130 --> 00:33:48,060
through and roll up 12
positions, repel several

558
00:33:48,060 --> 00:33:49,790
counter attacks and take

559
00:33:49,790 --> 00:33:52,733
more than 300 heavily fortified bunkers.

560
00:33:53,820 --> 00:33:56,460
Like all German operations in Russia

561
00:33:56,460 --> 00:33:59,480
from an early stage, it became
apparent to the commanders,

562
00:33:59,480 --> 00:34:00,510
to the troops,

563
00:34:00,510 --> 00:34:04,570
to the high command that the
task they had taken on and the

564
00:34:04,570 --> 00:34:07,800
tasks they may have to take
on were beginning to exceed

565
00:34:07,800 --> 00:34:10,303
by far, the resources to hand.

566
00:34:11,680 --> 00:34:12,760
In general terms,

567
00:34:12,760 --> 00:34:15,350
the forces were adequate
for the immediate tasks

568
00:34:15,350 --> 00:34:18,060
which Army Group North had to fulfill.

569
00:34:18,060 --> 00:34:20,370
It was a very accomplished command

570
00:34:20,370 --> 00:34:23,650
and it did manage to achieve
what Hitler ordered to be done,

571
00:34:23,650 --> 00:34:25,910
which was to seize the Baltic States,

572
00:34:25,910 --> 00:34:29,570
establishing them as a base for
further operations in Russia

573
00:34:29,570 --> 00:34:31,343
and move right up to Leningrad.

574
00:34:37,000 --> 00:34:39,630
From October, 1941 onwards,

575
00:34:39,630 --> 00:34:42,010
Hitler tended to
vacillate between striking

576
00:34:42,010 --> 00:34:45,490
into the Ukraine as the
main strategic objective

577
00:34:45,490 --> 00:34:46,840
and attacking Moscow,

578
00:34:46,840 --> 00:34:49,040
which was the nerve
center of Soviet Russia.

579
00:34:52,870 --> 00:34:54,140
Army Group North therefore

580
00:34:54,140 --> 00:34:57,483
came a poor third in terms
of allocation of resources.

581
00:34:58,330 --> 00:35:00,730
It is fair to suggest
that Hitler's high command

582
00:35:00,730 --> 00:35:04,150
failed to provide Von Leeb
with enough resources,

583
00:35:04,150 --> 00:35:07,180
which in turn prevented Army
Group North from achieving

584
00:35:07,180 --> 00:35:09,280
its objective of the capture of Leningrad.

585
00:35:16,506 --> 00:35:20,173
(series of loud explosions)

586
00:35:32,930 --> 00:35:33,880
In the North,

587
00:35:33,880 --> 00:35:35,610
the fighting for the Stalin line

588
00:35:35,610 --> 00:35:37,810
proved to be an attritional nightmare

589
00:35:37,810 --> 00:35:40,000
with German casualties soon mounting

590
00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:41,773
to first world war levels.

591
00:35:43,310 --> 00:35:45,490
The Russians were very adept at preparing

592
00:35:45,490 --> 00:35:48,230
inhabited places for defense.

593
00:35:48,230 --> 00:35:49,500
In a short time,

594
00:35:49,500 --> 00:35:52,163
a village would be converted
into a little fortress.

595
00:35:53,060 --> 00:35:55,670
Wooden houses had well
camouflaged gun ports

596
00:35:55,670 --> 00:35:57,880
almost flush with the floor.

597
00:35:57,880 --> 00:36:01,650
Their interiors were reinforced
with sandbags or earth.

598
00:36:01,650 --> 00:36:05,220
Observation slots were cut into
roofs and bunkers built into

599
00:36:05,220 --> 00:36:08,380
floors and connected with
adjacent houses or outside

600
00:36:08,380 --> 00:36:10,968
defenses by narrow trenches.

601
00:36:10,968 --> 00:36:13,968
(suspenseful music)

602
00:36:18,290 --> 00:36:20,330
Although almost all inhabited places

603
00:36:20,330 --> 00:36:22,170
were crammed with troops,

604
00:36:22,170 --> 00:36:25,650
they seem deserted to German
reconnaissance since even water

605
00:36:25,650 --> 00:36:27,470
and food details were allowed to leave

606
00:36:27,470 --> 00:36:29,573
their shelters only after dark.

607
00:36:44,935 --> 00:36:47,768
(large explosion)

608
00:36:48,700 --> 00:36:51,330
The Russians blocked approach
routes with well camouflaged

609
00:36:51,330 --> 00:36:54,560
anti-tank guns or dug-in tanks.

610
00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:57,230
Wrecks of knocked out tanks
were specially favored

611
00:36:57,230 --> 00:36:59,170
for use as observation posts.

612
00:36:59,170 --> 00:37:01,880
And as in placements for
heavy infantry weapons

613
00:37:01,880 --> 00:37:04,923
and bunkers for living
quarters were dug under them.

614
00:37:07,270 --> 00:37:09,990
Permanent structures
destroyed by artillery fire,

615
00:37:09,990 --> 00:37:14,060
or aerial bombs were
utilized as defense points,

616
00:37:14,060 --> 00:37:16,560
the ruins hid weapons
and served to strengthen

617
00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:18,750
the underlying bunkers.

618
00:37:18,750 --> 00:37:21,310
Even the heaviest shelling
would not drive the Russians

619
00:37:21,310 --> 00:37:23,200
from these positions.

620
00:37:23,200 --> 00:37:26,230
They could only be
dislodged with hand grenades

621
00:37:26,230 --> 00:37:29,743
or flame throwers in costly
hand-to-hand fighting.

622
00:37:30,830 --> 00:37:33,110
The Russians when they did retreat

623
00:37:33,110 --> 00:37:36,480
frequently burned or blasted
building suitable for housing

624
00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:39,853
command posts or other important
military installations.

625
00:37:40,750 --> 00:37:43,570
Quite often, however, they left castles,

626
00:37:43,570 --> 00:37:47,850
former country seats and other
spacious dwellings intact,

627
00:37:47,850 --> 00:37:51,060
but only after they had mined
the walls in a completely

628
00:37:51,060 --> 00:37:54,010
inconspicuous manner with
delayed action bombs,

629
00:37:54,010 --> 00:37:56,853
which were often set to
explode several weeks later.

630
00:37:58,050 --> 00:38:00,630
These were meant to blow up
entire German headquarters

631
00:38:00,630 --> 00:38:01,633
at one time.

632
00:38:02,750 --> 00:38:05,800
The possible presence
of time bombs in cities,

633
00:38:05,800 --> 00:38:07,828
railroad stations, bridges,

634
00:38:07,828 --> 00:38:11,270
and other important structures
always had to be taken into

635
00:38:11,270 --> 00:38:13,170
account in German thinking,

636
00:38:13,170 --> 00:38:15,593
exacting a great psychological toll.

637
00:38:19,957 --> 00:38:23,040
(distant explosions)

638
00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:27,590
Entirely new to the Germans
was the Russian use of forest

639
00:38:27,590 --> 00:38:30,160
fires as a hot weather weapon.

640
00:38:30,160 --> 00:38:31,930
In mid-summer when the trees

641
00:38:31,930 --> 00:38:33,320
were tinder dry,

642
00:38:33,320 --> 00:38:36,230
the Russians attempted to
delay German forces advancing

643
00:38:36,230 --> 00:38:39,453
on Leningrad by putting
forests to the torch.

644
00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:41,640
Not only the physical,

645
00:38:41,640 --> 00:38:45,480
but the psychological impact
of such fires was severe.

646
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:47,600
The crackling of the burning trees,

647
00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:49,950
the acrid gray black smoke,

648
00:38:49,950 --> 00:38:52,870
the increasingly unbearable
heat and the feeling

649
00:38:52,870 --> 00:38:56,573
of uncertainty put troops
under a severe strain.

650
00:39:04,620 --> 00:39:07,540
Despite the tenacity of a
hard fought series of grueling

651
00:39:07,540 --> 00:39:10,530
battles in which the SS
police division particularly

652
00:39:10,530 --> 00:39:13,230
distinguished itself, the Stalin line

653
00:39:13,230 --> 00:39:16,160
was finally broken in late August

654
00:39:16,160 --> 00:39:19,103
and Army Group North surged onwards.

655
00:39:22,926 --> 00:39:25,593
(ominous music)

656
00:39:33,680 --> 00:39:36,580
On the Baltic front, Von
Leeb's Army Group North

657
00:39:36,580 --> 00:39:38,950
had captured the city of Novgorod,

658
00:39:38,950 --> 00:39:41,413
a vital target in the
approach to Leningrad.

659
00:39:42,600 --> 00:39:44,970
The beleaguered defenders of Novgorod

660
00:39:44,970 --> 00:39:46,650
had fought to the death.

661
00:39:46,650 --> 00:39:48,933
But this resistance too had been in vain.

662
00:39:50,320 --> 00:39:53,070
The Germans had discovered
the city's defensive plans

663
00:39:53,070 --> 00:39:54,963
on the corpse of a Soviet officer.

664
00:40:00,770 --> 00:40:02,880
With the Stalin line broken

665
00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:06,210
general Hoepner's fourth
Panzer group resumed its drive

666
00:40:06,210 --> 00:40:09,560
toward Leningrad, but
without supporting infantry

667
00:40:09,560 --> 00:40:10,953
its progress was limited.

668
00:40:12,902 --> 00:40:14,310
(ominous music)

669
00:40:14,310 --> 00:40:17,250
Leningrad was a vital center
of the wartime production

670
00:40:17,250 --> 00:40:20,060
industry and reserves
and equipment were poured

671
00:40:20,060 --> 00:40:21,593
into the defense of the city.

672
00:40:22,430 --> 00:40:23,869
As the Germans approached,

673
00:40:23,869 --> 00:40:27,800
the citizens now formed into
militia divisions of which

674
00:40:27,800 --> 00:40:31,163
were flung against the Germans
more in despair than hope.

675
00:40:32,270 --> 00:40:36,170
Following a basic training
period, averaging 16 hours,

676
00:40:36,170 --> 00:40:39,160
the first militia divisions
were sent to the front only six

677
00:40:39,160 --> 00:40:41,660
days after being formed.

678
00:40:41,660 --> 00:40:44,850
The second division marched to
the front only two days after

679
00:40:44,850 --> 00:40:47,260
its establishment and the third,

680
00:40:47,260 --> 00:40:50,128
the same day it was established.

681
00:40:50,128 --> 00:40:53,378
(series of explosions)

682
00:41:01,117 --> 00:41:03,950
(large explosion)

683
00:41:27,860 --> 00:41:30,550
Nonetheless, some Russian civilians

684
00:41:30,550 --> 00:41:33,670
obviously felt caught between two fires,

685
00:41:33,670 --> 00:41:35,620
one senior Soviet officer

686
00:41:35,620 --> 00:41:38,020
later summed up the choices available.

687
00:41:38,020 --> 00:41:40,230
He declared, "We were faced with a choice

688
00:41:40,230 --> 00:41:43,830
between two dictators
Hitler on the one hand

689
00:41:43,830 --> 00:41:46,000
and Stalin on the other.

690
00:41:46,000 --> 00:41:48,667
But we prefer to pick the
one who spoke Russian."

691
00:41:51,139 --> 00:41:53,806
(ominous music)

692
00:42:01,460 --> 00:42:04,370
An ominous development for
the Germans at this point

693
00:42:04,370 --> 00:42:06,020
was the appearance on the battlefield

694
00:42:06,020 --> 00:42:11,020
of the Russian medium T34
tank and the heavy KV 1.

695
00:42:11,570 --> 00:42:14,380
Both of these machines were
clearly superior to the German

696
00:42:14,380 --> 00:42:16,610
tanks and were all but impervious

697
00:42:16,610 --> 00:42:19,090
to most German anti-tank weapons,

698
00:42:19,090 --> 00:42:22,970
especially the puny 37
millimeter anti-tank gun,

699
00:42:22,970 --> 00:42:26,270
which was then the main
German anti-tank weapon.

700
00:42:26,270 --> 00:42:30,240
The 37 millimeter was so
ineffective against Soviet armor

701
00:42:30,240 --> 00:42:33,410
that it was nicknamed "the door
knocker" by the disgruntled

702
00:42:33,410 --> 00:42:34,963
German anti-tank gunners.

703
00:42:36,070 --> 00:42:39,470
These puny 37 millimeter
guns were intended to deal

704
00:42:39,470 --> 00:42:42,400
with some of the best armor in the world.

705
00:42:42,400 --> 00:42:46,030
General Erhard Raus who
fought with Army Group North

706
00:42:46,030 --> 00:42:48,170
left a clear account
of the first encounter

707
00:42:48,170 --> 00:42:49,610
with the new Russian armor

708
00:42:49,610 --> 00:42:51,690
in the shape of the trusty KV1 tanks,

709
00:42:51,690 --> 00:42:53,740
which attacked the third Panzer division.

710
00:42:55,197 --> 00:42:59,040
"Then there suddenly appeared
for the first time a battalion

711
00:42:59,040 --> 00:43:02,523
of heavy enemy tanks of
previously unknown type.

712
00:43:03,460 --> 00:43:06,700
The tanks overran the armored
infantry regiment and broke

713
00:43:06,700 --> 00:43:08,500
through into the artillery position.

714
00:43:15,430 --> 00:43:19,400
The projectiles of all defense
weapons bounced off the thick

715
00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:24,400
enemy armor, 100 German tanks
were unable to check the 20

716
00:43:24,460 --> 00:43:27,063
Russian dreadnoughts and suffered losses.

717
00:43:28,060 --> 00:43:29,860
Several Czech built tanks,

718
00:43:29,860 --> 00:43:32,120
which are bogged down in
the grain fields because of

719
00:43:32,120 --> 00:43:36,250
mechanical trouble were
flattened by the enemy monsters.

720
00:43:36,250 --> 00:43:39,080
The same fate befell a 150 millimeter

721
00:43:39,080 --> 00:43:40,940
medium Howitzer battery,

722
00:43:40,940 --> 00:43:43,313
which kept on firing
until the last minute.

723
00:43:44,200 --> 00:43:47,650
Despite the fact that it scored
numerous direct hits from as

724
00:43:47,650 --> 00:43:51,270
close a range as 200
yards, it's heavy shells

725
00:43:51,270 --> 00:43:54,413
were unable to put even a
single rank out of action.

726
00:43:55,360 --> 00:43:57,840
The situation became critical.

727
00:43:57,840 --> 00:44:01,440
Only the 88 millimeter flak
finally knocked out a few

728
00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:02,450
of the Russian KV1s

729
00:44:03,360 --> 00:44:06,317
and forced the others to
withdraw into the woods."

730
00:44:07,725 --> 00:44:10,725
(suspenseful music)

731
00:44:15,000 --> 00:44:17,940
The only bright sign for the
Wehrmacht was that the new

732
00:44:17,940 --> 00:44:21,180
Russian tanks were still
in relatively short supply

733
00:44:21,180 --> 00:44:22,873
and their battle drill was poor.

734
00:44:24,200 --> 00:44:27,090
Once the scattered formations
have been dealt with the road

735
00:44:27,090 --> 00:44:29,313
to Leningrad lay open again.

736
00:44:39,478 --> 00:44:41,895
(gun blasts)

737
00:45:03,050 --> 00:45:05,960
Despite the limitations
of some of its weaponry,

738
00:45:05,960 --> 00:45:08,160
by September, Army Group North

739
00:45:08,160 --> 00:45:10,930
had destroyed for all practical purposes,

740
00:45:10,930 --> 00:45:12,623
the Soviet Northwest front,

741
00:45:13,555 --> 00:45:16,290
it had virtually eliminated
two Russian armies

742
00:45:16,290 --> 00:45:18,363
driven to the outskirts of Leningrad.

743
00:45:19,340 --> 00:45:21,890
The collapse of the
Northwestern front was a real

744
00:45:21,890 --> 00:45:25,170
catastrophe for the Red
Army and brought Stalin

745
00:45:25,170 --> 00:45:26,743
to the brink of despair.

746
00:45:28,139 --> 00:45:30,150
Leningrad's fate hung by a thread

747
00:45:30,150 --> 00:45:32,180
at the beginning of September,

748
00:45:32,180 --> 00:45:35,780
but Stalin was to make one inspired move.

749
00:45:35,780 --> 00:45:39,170
He appointed Marshal Zhukov
to the command of Leningrad.

750
00:45:39,170 --> 00:45:40,870
And this remarkable soldier

751
00:45:40,870 --> 00:45:43,635
was to prove himself equal to the task.

752
00:45:43,635 --> 00:45:46,635
(suspenseful music)

753
00:45:48,970 --> 00:45:52,500
As Army Group North drove
headlong towards Leningrad,

754
00:45:52,500 --> 00:45:56,110
a further huge haul of confused
Russian prisoners was taken

755
00:45:56,110 --> 00:45:59,800
in the Baltic States and a
large body of Russian troops was

756
00:45:59,800 --> 00:46:03,570
isolated in what became known
as the Oranienbaum pocket

757
00:46:03,570 --> 00:46:06,263
on the Baltic coast to
the West of Leningrad.

758
00:46:11,700 --> 00:46:14,610
The Oranienbaum pocket
was a small semicircle

759
00:46:14,610 --> 00:46:16,740
of Russian held territory,

760
00:46:16,740 --> 00:46:19,350
an area of ground that
was never to be taken

761
00:46:19,350 --> 00:46:20,800
by army group North,

762
00:46:20,800 --> 00:46:24,150
despite all attempts over
the next three years.

763
00:46:24,150 --> 00:46:26,000
And it was to prove a tactical thorn

764
00:46:26,000 --> 00:46:27,733
in the side of the 18th army.

765
00:46:29,820 --> 00:46:32,010
When the 18th army in Panzer Group IV

766
00:46:32,010 --> 00:46:35,840
burst into the Leningrad
area in September, 1941,

767
00:46:35,840 --> 00:46:38,430
they swept forward at high speed

768
00:46:38,430 --> 00:46:40,290
and as they moved swiftly North,

769
00:46:40,290 --> 00:46:43,853
they either destroyed or
brushed aside the Soviet armies.

770
00:46:49,090 --> 00:46:51,840
One tiny element of
the Soviet eighth army,

771
00:46:51,840 --> 00:46:54,480
which had suffered
catastrophically from the attack

772
00:46:54,480 --> 00:46:57,110
was pushed right up to the coast.

773
00:46:57,110 --> 00:47:00,080
There, around the town of Oranienbaum,

774
00:47:00,080 --> 00:47:02,940
three elements of the eighth
army kept up resistance

775
00:47:02,940 --> 00:47:05,400
for virtually three years.

776
00:47:05,400 --> 00:47:08,573
The bridge had acquired
enormous strategic significance.

777
00:47:09,924 --> 00:47:12,924
(suspenseful music)

778
00:47:28,350 --> 00:47:30,590
The Oranienbaum area enabled the Russians

779
00:47:30,590 --> 00:47:33,300
to protect the Island of Kronstadt.

780
00:47:33,300 --> 00:47:36,150
This Island was vital to
the Naval base directly

781
00:47:36,150 --> 00:47:37,543
to the West of Leningrad.

782
00:47:38,660 --> 00:47:40,900
It enabled the Soviet
forces in the region,

783
00:47:40,900 --> 00:47:44,230
both Naval and military, to
prevent the German forces

784
00:47:44,230 --> 00:47:46,890
of army group North completely denying

785
00:47:46,890 --> 00:47:49,640
Leningrad the resources
which enabled it to survive

786
00:47:49,640 --> 00:47:51,643
the subsequent siege of Leningrad.

787
00:47:52,577 --> 00:47:56,400
(suspenseful music)

788
00:47:56,400 --> 00:47:58,850
On September the fourth, 1941

789
00:47:58,850 --> 00:48:02,060
senior lieutenant Dariusz
of the first Panzer regiment

790
00:48:02,060 --> 00:48:04,010
radioed back to headquarters

791
00:48:04,010 --> 00:48:06,313
that his unit had reached Leningrad.

792
00:48:09,670 --> 00:48:12,720
Other units from the 18th
army pressed on to capture

793
00:48:12,720 --> 00:48:15,043
Shlisselburg to the East of Leningrad.

794
00:48:16,490 --> 00:48:19,210
With the arrival of the
rest of the 18th army

795
00:48:19,210 --> 00:48:22,500
to reinforce the Panzers,
on the 8th of September,

796
00:48:22,500 --> 00:48:23,860
the German stranglehold

797
00:48:23,860 --> 00:48:26,353
on the city of Leningrad
tightened further.

798
00:48:27,220 --> 00:48:29,680
The capture of Shlisselburg to the East

799
00:48:29,680 --> 00:48:31,953
signaled the end of rail transport.

800
00:48:32,880 --> 00:48:36,020
The German invaders
surged on as far as Tikvin

801
00:48:36,020 --> 00:48:37,963
deep inside the Russian hinterland.

802
00:48:39,040 --> 00:48:41,730
Despite the best efforts
of the population,

803
00:48:41,730 --> 00:48:43,940
the first shells began to rain down

804
00:48:43,940 --> 00:48:47,060
on Leningrad early in September.

805
00:48:47,060 --> 00:48:50,880
It marked the beginning of a
crucial episode in the war.

806
00:48:50,880 --> 00:48:55,880
The Epic siege of the city,
which would last for 900 days.

807
00:48:56,044 --> 00:48:59,044
(suspenseful music)

808
00:49:05,055 --> 00:49:07,805
(loud explosion)

809
00:49:25,127 --> 00:49:27,794
(ominous music)

810
00:49:40,740 --> 00:49:43,950
As the German advance into
Northern Russia continued

811
00:49:43,950 --> 00:49:46,143
the rail link to Leningrad was cut.

812
00:49:47,180 --> 00:49:49,080
The fate of Leningrad and with it,

813
00:49:49,080 --> 00:49:51,953
30 Russian divisions
appeared to be sealed.

814
00:49:52,840 --> 00:49:55,910
The next stage of the battle
was expected to be an attack

815
00:49:55,910 --> 00:49:57,173
on the beleaguered city.

816
00:49:58,695 --> 00:50:01,641
(weapon blasts)

817
00:50:01,641 --> 00:50:04,354
(weapon blasts)

818
00:50:04,354 --> 00:50:07,187
(distant gunfire)

819
00:50:14,000 --> 00:50:16,320
Contrary to their own expectations

820
00:50:16,320 --> 00:50:19,310
the men of the German 18th
army were not to be asked

821
00:50:19,310 --> 00:50:21,880
to mount a full-scale attack on the city.

822
00:50:21,880 --> 00:50:24,270
And after a series of
hotly contested battles

823
00:50:24,270 --> 00:50:25,650
for the outskirts,

824
00:50:25,650 --> 00:50:29,090
Hitler uncharacteristically
ordered his troops to take

825
00:50:29,090 --> 00:50:32,183
Leningrad by means of
a long drawn out siege.

826
00:50:33,240 --> 00:50:35,360
It has been suggested that he was unnerved

827
00:50:35,360 --> 00:50:37,440
by the remote controlled explosions,

828
00:50:37,440 --> 00:50:41,000
which the Russians had used
so effectively in Kiev.

829
00:50:41,000 --> 00:50:44,503
It is a decision which
still provokes debate today.

830
00:50:48,870 --> 00:50:51,910
There are really two possible
explanations for the failure

831
00:50:51,910 --> 00:50:54,980
of Army Group North to take Leningrad.

832
00:50:54,980 --> 00:50:57,280
One was the conflicting
priorities in the mind

833
00:50:57,280 --> 00:51:00,063
of Adolf Hitler and the army high command.

834
00:51:01,270 --> 00:51:02,940
Hitler vacillated between

835
00:51:02,940 --> 00:51:05,323
prioritizing a number of objectives.

836
00:51:06,410 --> 00:51:07,740
There is also a school of thought

837
00:51:07,740 --> 00:51:10,830
which favors Hitler's adverse
reaction to the huge losses

838
00:51:10,830 --> 00:51:14,333
of the German sixth army in
Kiev in August and September.

839
00:51:15,390 --> 00:51:17,900
In Kiev, thousands of German troops

840
00:51:17,900 --> 00:51:20,710
were lost to remote controlled explosions

841
00:51:20,710 --> 00:51:23,663
and thousands of others to
desperate street fighting.

842
00:51:25,330 --> 00:51:26,800
This, it is thought,

843
00:51:26,800 --> 00:51:29,620
persuaded Hitler that
no German troops should

844
00:51:29,620 --> 00:51:32,150
be made vulnerable by committing
them to the inner city

845
00:51:32,150 --> 00:51:35,000
streets of Moscow and Leningrad.

846
00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:36,150
In any event,

847
00:51:36,150 --> 00:51:39,670
the 18th army lacked the really
heavy artillery necessary

848
00:51:39,670 --> 00:51:41,883
to reduce the defenses of Leningrad.

849
00:51:42,790 --> 00:51:46,060
The massive guns of the German
siege train had already been

850
00:51:46,060 --> 00:51:48,930
allocated to the sector
of Army Group South,

851
00:51:48,930 --> 00:51:50,930
where they were earmarked
for the coming battles

852
00:51:50,930 --> 00:51:51,913
in the Crimea.

853
00:51:52,920 --> 00:51:55,630
To move them all the way across Russia

854
00:51:55,630 --> 00:51:57,953
would have delayed the
operation into winter.

855
00:52:14,090 --> 00:52:15,880
To compound the problems of the battles

856
00:52:15,880 --> 00:52:18,270
for the attackers, Panzer group four

857
00:52:18,270 --> 00:52:22,600
was withdrawn from Army Group
North in late September, 1941

858
00:52:22,600 --> 00:52:26,610
in order to support Army Group
Center in operation Typhoon,

859
00:52:26,610 --> 00:52:28,293
the final drive on Moscow.

860
00:52:30,930 --> 00:52:34,250
No German Army Group could
afford to lose its tanks,

861
00:52:34,250 --> 00:52:37,623
but Army Group North lost
virtually all of its armor.

862
00:52:38,890 --> 00:52:41,280
The withdrawal of the
tanks from Army Group North

863
00:52:41,280 --> 00:52:43,910
meant that the army
was virtually immobile.

864
00:52:43,910 --> 00:52:47,253
It was to remain so
for almost three years.

865
00:52:53,423 --> 00:52:56,090
(rapid gunfire)

866
00:53:05,201 --> 00:53:07,534
(loud boom)

867
00:53:10,217 --> 00:53:12,884
(weapon blasts)

868
00:53:14,660 --> 00:53:17,360
It is easy to suggest that
the loss of Panzer Group four

869
00:53:17,360 --> 00:53:19,460
in September, 1941

870
00:53:19,460 --> 00:53:21,570
was directly responsible for the failure

871
00:53:21,570 --> 00:53:23,820
of Army Group North to take its strategic

872
00:53:23,820 --> 00:53:25,770
objective of Leningrad.

873
00:53:25,770 --> 00:53:29,220
However, this is by no means certain.

874
00:53:29,220 --> 00:53:30,890
The capture of a city as large

875
00:53:30,890 --> 00:53:34,790
and well defended as Leningrad
was by no means certain,

876
00:53:34,790 --> 00:53:36,973
even with a strong armored force.

877
00:53:38,030 --> 00:53:41,170
Nevertheless, the removal
of Panzer Group four

878
00:53:41,170 --> 00:53:44,690
clearly did not help the
cause of Army Group North.

879
00:53:44,690 --> 00:53:47,380
It meant that Army Group
North would be denied this one

880
00:53:47,380 --> 00:53:51,210
formation and the size, speed
and fighting power to advance

881
00:53:51,210 --> 00:53:54,960
quickly into the regions
beyond the city of Leningrad,

882
00:53:54,960 --> 00:53:57,760
link up with the Fins
and effectively cut off

883
00:53:57,760 --> 00:53:59,423
the city from its supplies.

884
00:54:01,490 --> 00:54:04,210
The disappearance of Panzer
Group four proved to be

885
00:54:04,210 --> 00:54:07,070
a forerunner of things to come.

886
00:54:07,070 --> 00:54:08,500
From that point onwards,

887
00:54:08,500 --> 00:54:12,450
the evidence was clear that of
the three German army groups

888
00:54:12,450 --> 00:54:16,013
Army Group North was considered
to be the poor relation.

889
00:54:18,430 --> 00:54:21,440
It soon became obvious that
they could expect to receive no

890
00:54:21,440 --> 00:54:24,490
substantial additional
support of any kind.

891
00:54:24,490 --> 00:54:26,420
And the artillery siege train

892
00:54:26,420 --> 00:54:28,233
would never be sent to Leningrad.

893
00:54:29,220 --> 00:54:31,690
The 18th army, therefore,
had no alternative,

894
00:54:31,690 --> 00:54:34,800
but to take Leningrad by siege.

895
00:54:34,800 --> 00:54:38,090
It seemed that the decisive
battles on the Eastern front

896
00:54:38,090 --> 00:54:40,038
would be fought elsewhere.

897
00:54:40,038 --> 00:54:43,038
(suspenseful music)

898
00:54:44,092 --> 00:54:46,985
(loud blast)

899
00:54:46,985 --> 00:54:49,568
(weapon blast)

900
00:55:04,200 --> 00:55:06,690
With the commencement of
the siege of Leningrad,

901
00:55:06,690 --> 00:55:08,610
a relatively stable frontline

902
00:55:08,610 --> 00:55:11,190
appeared in the Northern sector.

903
00:55:11,190 --> 00:55:13,480
The 16th army fought on the right flank

904
00:55:13,480 --> 00:55:14,790
of the Northern sector,

905
00:55:14,790 --> 00:55:18,173
where it was adjacent to the
left wing of Army Group Center.

906
00:55:19,250 --> 00:55:21,680
The 18th Army fought on the left flank

907
00:55:21,680 --> 00:55:24,080
of the 16th army and as such

908
00:55:24,080 --> 00:55:26,963
formed the extreme Northern
end of the front line.

909
00:55:31,260 --> 00:55:34,440
Army Group North was to
remain doggedly committed

910
00:55:34,440 --> 00:55:35,510
to the Northern flank

911
00:55:35,510 --> 00:55:38,210
of the German armies
fighting on the Eastern front

912
00:55:38,210 --> 00:55:40,253
for the entire duration of the war.

913
00:55:41,743 --> 00:55:44,826
(distant explosions)

914
00:56:03,254 --> 00:56:06,309
(weapon blasts)

915
00:56:06,309 --> 00:56:08,976
(weapon blasts)

916
00:56:13,539 --> 00:56:16,206
(rapid gunfire)

917
00:56:18,010 --> 00:56:21,930
The siege of Leningrad was the
stage for an intense struggle

918
00:56:21,930 --> 00:56:25,220
that would in later years
be recognized as a key event

919
00:56:25,220 --> 00:56:27,773
in that conflict of inhuman savagery.

920
00:56:30,800 --> 00:56:33,280
The opening stages were bitterly fought

921
00:56:33,280 --> 00:56:34,850
in the suburbs of the city.

922
00:56:49,100 --> 00:56:51,767
(weapon blasts)

923
00:56:54,742 --> 00:56:57,409
(weapon blasts)

924
00:57:02,188 --> 00:57:04,855
(weapon blasts)

925
00:57:06,158 --> 00:57:09,630
(weapon blasts)

926
00:57:09,630 --> 00:57:12,297
(ominous music)

927
00:57:20,241 --> 00:57:22,470
(people chattering)

928
00:57:22,470 --> 00:57:24,930
When general Zhukov arrived
to take over the defense

929
00:57:24,930 --> 00:57:28,180
of the city on the 10th
of September, 1941,

930
00:57:28,180 --> 00:57:30,420
he found the defenders
in an advanced state

931
00:57:30,420 --> 00:57:34,163
of disorganization and the
inhabitants close to panic.

932
00:57:38,180 --> 00:57:41,863
Undaunted, he briskly set
about bolstering its defenses.

933
00:57:42,930 --> 00:57:46,020
A shortage of anti-tank guns
was dealt with by converting

934
00:57:46,020 --> 00:57:48,530
anti-aircraft artillery to the task

935
00:57:48,530 --> 00:57:50,363
of attempting to halt the Panzers.

936
00:57:51,230 --> 00:57:54,330
Six brigades of Naval
infantry and students were

937
00:57:54,330 --> 00:57:56,870
formed and reinforcements drafted in

938
00:57:56,870 --> 00:57:59,180
from the Karelian Isthmus.

939
00:57:59,180 --> 00:58:02,000
Zhukov began to take
the fight to the Germans

940
00:58:02,000 --> 00:58:04,360
through raids and counter attacks.

941
00:58:04,360 --> 00:58:07,640
But by now the German troops
had pierced the inner circle

942
00:58:07,640 --> 00:58:10,943
of defenses and were
rampaging through the suburbs.

943
00:58:13,290 --> 00:58:15,957
(rapid gunfire)

944
00:58:20,730 --> 00:58:24,000
After a furious exchange
of advances and retreats,

945
00:58:24,000 --> 00:58:25,250
by the end of the month,

946
00:58:25,250 --> 00:58:27,090
the defenders were hanging onto their city

947
00:58:27,090 --> 00:58:28,880
by their fingernails.

948
00:58:28,880 --> 00:58:32,290
It seemed inevitable that
Leningrad would capitulate,

949
00:58:32,290 --> 00:58:35,100
but as Zhukov awaited a renewed assault,

950
00:58:35,100 --> 00:58:37,890
the fourth Panzer group suddenly departed

951
00:58:37,890 --> 00:58:40,150
to join the battle for Moscow

952
00:58:40,150 --> 00:58:43,643
and the remaining German
forces began to build defenses.

953
00:58:44,770 --> 00:58:46,820
Hitler had decreed that Leningrad

954
00:58:46,820 --> 00:58:48,920
would not be taken by force.

955
00:58:48,920 --> 00:58:52,380
It would instead be
starved into submission,

956
00:58:52,380 --> 00:58:54,143
but there was a flaw in the plan.

957
00:58:55,730 --> 00:58:57,780
Although the supply
situation was difficult,

958
00:58:57,780 --> 00:58:59,570
without Panzer Group four

959
00:58:59,570 --> 00:59:03,193
the ring around the city
was never completely closed.

960
00:59:04,260 --> 00:59:07,690
It was still possible to reach
the city over land through

961
00:59:07,690 --> 00:59:10,840
the Virgin forests of
the Russian motherland.

962
00:59:10,840 --> 00:59:14,150
It was also possible to
bring in supplies by boat,

963
00:59:14,150 --> 00:59:15,800
across the waters of Lake Lagoda.

964
00:59:20,420 --> 00:59:23,040
In October, there was
some temporary relief

965
00:59:23,040 --> 00:59:24,900
for the defenders.

966
00:59:24,900 --> 00:59:28,980
The roads had disintegrated
into canals of bottomless mud

967
00:59:28,980 --> 00:59:32,640
along which wheeled vehicles
could drive only at a snail's

968
00:59:32,640 --> 00:59:36,083
pace and only if they were towed by tanks.

969
00:59:37,580 --> 00:59:41,430
This was the "rasputitsa",
the season of mud,

970
00:59:41,430 --> 00:59:43,510
which came as a debilitating surprise

971
00:59:43,510 --> 00:59:46,200
to the Germans in 1941,

972
00:59:46,200 --> 00:59:49,940
general Raus went to great
lengths after the war to explain

973
00:59:49,940 --> 00:59:52,203
the great significance
of the muddy season.

974
00:59:54,527 --> 00:59:58,450
"German losses of tanks and
motorized equipment of all types

975
00:59:58,450 --> 01:00:00,750
were extraordinarily
high during the autumn

976
01:00:00,750 --> 01:00:03,290
muddy period of 1941.

977
01:00:03,290 --> 01:00:07,680
The first time that the mud
of Russia was encountered a

978
01:00:07,680 --> 01:00:10,880
division of the fourth Panzer
group operating in the area

979
01:00:10,880 --> 01:00:13,960
North of Gzhatsk, during the same period,

980
01:00:13,960 --> 01:00:17,240
lost 50 tanks without a shot being fired.

981
01:00:17,240 --> 01:00:19,193
35 of them within three days,

982
01:00:20,160 --> 01:00:23,110
these losses were
extremely serious since no

983
01:00:23,110 --> 01:00:24,887
replacements were received."

984
01:00:35,770 --> 01:00:38,950
The Germans had no conception
of mud as it exists

985
01:00:38,950 --> 01:00:41,080
in European Russia.

986
01:00:41,080 --> 01:00:43,230
In the autumn of 1941,

987
01:00:43,230 --> 01:00:46,310
when frontline troops
were already stuck fast,

988
01:00:46,310 --> 01:00:49,300
the German high command still
believed that mud could be

989
01:00:49,300 --> 01:00:51,590
conquered by brute force.

990
01:00:51,590 --> 01:00:53,560
An idea that led to serious losses

991
01:00:53,560 --> 01:00:55,313
of vehicles and equipment.

992
01:00:56,470 --> 01:00:58,070
At the height of the muddy season,

993
01:00:58,070 --> 01:01:00,880
tractors and recovery
vehicles normally capable

994
01:01:00,880 --> 01:01:03,890
of traversing difficult
terrain are helpless,

995
01:01:03,890 --> 01:01:06,230
and attempts to plow
through the muddy mass

996
01:01:06,230 --> 01:01:09,160
makes roads even more impassable.

997
01:01:09,160 --> 01:01:11,540
Tanks, heavy recovery vehicles,

998
01:01:11,540 --> 01:01:14,030
and even vehicles with
good ground clearance

999
01:01:14,030 --> 01:01:17,550
simply pushed an ever-growing
wall of mud before them,

1000
01:01:17,550 --> 01:01:22,050
until they finally stopped half
buried by their own motion.

1001
01:01:34,320 --> 01:01:36,860
A sudden frost in the autumn of 1941,

1002
01:01:36,860 --> 01:01:39,770
cemented a crippled buried column

1003
01:01:39,770 --> 01:01:42,100
into a state of complete uselessness.

1004
01:01:42,100 --> 01:01:43,623
And it never moved again.

1005
01:01:44,770 --> 01:01:47,270
Because it could not be
reached in any other way,

1006
01:01:47,270 --> 01:01:51,640
gasoline, tow ropes and food
supplies were airdropped along

1007
01:01:51,640 --> 01:01:53,690
the line of stranded armor,

1008
01:01:53,690 --> 01:01:56,083
but all attempts to move, were futile.

1009
01:02:08,570 --> 01:02:11,490
Often when drivers found
themselves bogged down

1010
01:02:11,490 --> 01:02:13,320
far from any habitation,

1011
01:02:13,320 --> 01:02:16,990
they abandoned their vehicles
and set out on foot to contact

1012
01:02:16,990 --> 01:02:19,340
friendly troops in the nearest village

1013
01:02:19,340 --> 01:02:20,610
or sought food and shelter

1014
01:02:20,610 --> 01:02:24,230
from local civilians in
order to remain alive until

1015
01:02:24,230 --> 01:02:26,363
the worst of the muddy season passed.

1016
01:02:29,410 --> 01:02:33,290
For the muddy seasons, vehicles
with high ground clearance,

1017
01:02:33,290 --> 01:02:37,530
lightweight and low unit
ground pressure were necessary.

1018
01:02:37,530 --> 01:02:40,790
German trucks had low ground
clearance and could not get

1019
01:02:40,790 --> 01:02:43,090
traction in deep mud.

1020
01:02:43,090 --> 01:02:46,410
Since German supply cars had
wheels too narrow for muddy

1021
01:02:46,410 --> 01:02:50,900
terrain, they sank deep into soft ground.

1022
01:02:50,900 --> 01:02:53,510
Even the German Maultier and Ost schlepper

1023
01:02:53,510 --> 01:02:56,360
of the later years were bogged down in mud

1024
01:02:56,360 --> 01:02:58,233
as their tracks were too narrow.

1025
01:02:59,140 --> 01:03:01,380
Raus noted that the awkward looking

1026
01:03:01,380 --> 01:03:04,780
and slow Russian tractor
of pre-war vintage

1027
01:03:04,780 --> 01:03:08,240
salvaged the heaviest
most deeply mired loads

1028
01:03:08,240 --> 01:03:10,523
after German equipment
failed to budge them.

1029
01:03:26,820 --> 01:03:30,970
Inside Leningrad, food
supplies to the besieged city

1030
01:03:30,970 --> 01:03:33,920
had been diminishing
throughout the autumn.

1031
01:03:33,920 --> 01:03:35,220
By late November,

1032
01:03:35,220 --> 01:03:37,640
they were at their lowest
ebb for the entire duration

1033
01:03:37,640 --> 01:03:38,533
of the siege.

1034
01:03:39,700 --> 01:03:41,240
Manual workers were receiving

1035
01:03:41,240 --> 01:03:44,700
only 250 grams of bread per day.

1036
01:03:44,700 --> 01:03:47,500
One third of their normal requirement.

1037
01:03:47,500 --> 01:03:49,440
Without water for sanitation

1038
01:03:49,440 --> 01:03:51,430
and basic medical supplies,

1039
01:03:51,430 --> 01:03:53,253
disease became inevitable.

1040
01:03:54,430 --> 01:03:56,360
As winter arrived and temperatures

1041
01:03:56,360 --> 01:03:58,130
fell to the minus twenties,

1042
01:03:58,130 --> 01:04:01,340
thousands began to die each day.

1043
01:04:01,340 --> 01:04:04,063
Total starvation threatened constantly.

1044
01:04:04,990 --> 01:04:06,000
To the Germans

1045
01:04:06,000 --> 01:04:07,603
collapse seemed imminent.

1046
01:04:26,800 --> 01:04:29,520
Back in Berlin, a
reception with Adolf Hitler

1047
01:04:29,520 --> 01:04:30,540
as a guest of honor,

1048
01:04:30,540 --> 01:04:33,523
was organized to celebrate
the fall of the stricken city.

1049
01:04:35,440 --> 01:04:38,923
The invitations were
printed, but never posted.

1050
01:04:47,930 --> 01:04:51,283
Russian resistance remained
stubborn and defiant.

1051
01:04:52,520 --> 01:04:56,760
Even women soldiers in the
Red Army were in combat units,

1052
01:04:56,760 --> 01:04:59,670
the ferocity and
inhumanity of the conflict

1053
01:04:59,670 --> 01:05:01,093
beggars the imagination.

1054
01:05:03,335 --> 01:05:06,085
(engine rumbles)

1055
01:05:11,110 --> 01:05:13,590
In an attempt to relieve
the appalling conditions

1056
01:05:13,590 --> 01:05:16,100
in the city, the Russians marked a road

1057
01:05:16,100 --> 01:05:19,710
across the frozen Southwest
corner of Lake Ladoga.

1058
01:05:19,710 --> 01:05:23,770
And by the 22nd of November,
convoys of supply lorries

1059
01:05:23,770 --> 01:05:26,683
were just managing to stave
off famine in the city.

1060
01:05:29,640 --> 01:05:32,800
It was a hazardous passage
through the biting Northeastern

1061
01:05:32,800 --> 01:05:34,803
gales, which swept across the Lake.

1062
01:05:42,510 --> 01:05:44,730
The German Luftwaffe also did its best

1063
01:05:44,730 --> 01:05:48,333
to intercept the convoys and
break the surface of the ice.

1064
01:05:56,140 --> 01:05:57,710
Yet for all its horror,

1065
01:05:57,710 --> 01:06:01,190
the Russians knew that defending
this lifeline to the city

1066
01:06:01,190 --> 01:06:04,673
was the only possible way of
keeping the inhabitants alive.

1067
01:06:08,540 --> 01:06:11,707
(airplane roars past)

1068
01:06:15,018 --> 01:06:17,790
(quick succession of blasts)

1069
01:06:17,790 --> 01:06:19,060
But for some,

1070
01:06:19,060 --> 01:06:22,963
the food coming across the
ice was too little too late.

1071
01:06:23,870 --> 01:06:27,750
Victims of starvation, suffering
from falling blood pressure

1072
01:06:27,750 --> 01:06:31,110
and the wasting of the heart
and internal organs would never

1073
01:06:31,110 --> 01:06:33,260
regain their health.

1074
01:06:33,260 --> 01:06:35,570
Many would die months after food

1075
01:06:35,570 --> 01:06:38,380
and medical supplies finally arrived.

1076
01:06:38,380 --> 01:06:41,840
The children who survived would
emerge totally traumatized

1077
01:06:41,840 --> 01:06:44,783
by the siege as an eyewitness recalled.

1078
01:06:46,877 --> 01:06:50,530
"It was reflected in the way
many of the children played all

1079
01:06:50,530 --> 01:06:54,800
by themselves in the way that
even in that collective games,

1080
01:06:54,800 --> 01:06:58,383
they played in silence with grave faces.

1081
01:06:59,430 --> 01:07:01,200
I saw faces of children,

1082
01:07:01,200 --> 01:07:05,120
which reflected such thoughtfulness
and sorrow that those

1083
01:07:05,120 --> 01:07:08,940
eyes and faces told one more
than could be gathered from all

1084
01:07:08,940 --> 01:07:11,237
the stories of the horrors of famine."

1085
01:07:21,210 --> 01:07:25,010
As events unfolded it soon
became clear that in spite of all

1086
01:07:25,010 --> 01:07:27,510
the hardships of the siege of Leningrad,

1087
01:07:27,510 --> 01:07:30,560
the Northern sector was
considered by both sides

1088
01:07:30,560 --> 01:07:33,200
to be of secondary importance.

1089
01:07:33,200 --> 01:07:34,690
The men of Army Group North

1090
01:07:34,690 --> 01:07:36,750
soon became convinced
that they were fighting

1091
01:07:36,750 --> 01:07:41,170
what they referred to as, "the
eternal war of the poor man".

1092
01:07:41,170 --> 01:07:43,510
Casualties along the
whole of the Russian front

1093
01:07:43,510 --> 01:07:44,830
had been enormous,

1094
01:07:44,830 --> 01:07:47,920
but only 67,000
replacements were allocated

1095
01:07:47,920 --> 01:07:49,940
to army group North

1096
01:07:49,940 --> 01:07:53,560
as against 131,000 to Army Group Center

1097
01:07:53,560 --> 01:07:56,773
and 119,000 to Army Group South.

1098
01:08:02,380 --> 01:08:04,530
When it came to allocating fresh divisions

1099
01:08:04,530 --> 01:08:06,450
from the reserves, the situation

1100
01:08:06,450 --> 01:08:08,300
was even less favorable.

1101
01:08:08,300 --> 01:08:10,440
Of 21 new divisions released

1102
01:08:10,440 --> 01:08:13,560
by army high command
in the autumn of 1941,

1103
01:08:13,560 --> 01:08:17,350
only three were allocated
to Army Group North.

1104
01:08:17,350 --> 01:08:19,650
It was a further indication
of things to come.

1105
01:08:29,030 --> 01:08:32,430
One unexpected benefit for the
Army Group was the occasional

1106
01:08:32,430 --> 01:08:35,090
support which they received
from German Naval units

1107
01:08:35,090 --> 01:08:36,423
operating in the Baltic.

1108
01:08:37,270 --> 01:08:39,960
As one flank rested on the Baltic seas

1109
01:08:39,960 --> 01:08:42,450
Army Group North was the
only formation which could

1110
01:08:42,450 --> 01:08:45,263
look for substantial support
from the Kriegsmarine.

1111
01:08:52,820 --> 01:08:55,290
The German Navy had
played a significant role

1112
01:08:55,290 --> 01:08:57,520
in the Soviet German war.

1113
01:08:57,520 --> 01:08:58,560
In the Baltic,

1114
01:08:58,560 --> 01:08:59,800
the Germans sealed up

1115
01:08:59,800 --> 01:09:02,910
the powerful Russian
front with minefields.

1116
01:09:02,910 --> 01:09:03,890
By doing so,

1117
01:09:03,890 --> 01:09:06,693
they also trapped the
Soviet submarine fleet.

1118
01:09:08,010 --> 01:09:11,300
As the Germans advanced
along the Baltic coastline,

1119
01:09:11,300 --> 01:09:15,010
they took control of Russian
bases so that the Soviet Baltic

1120
01:09:15,010 --> 01:09:17,953
fleet had to remain
bottled up in Leningrad.

1121
01:09:30,700 --> 01:09:34,730
The function of the Soviet
Baltic fleet during 1941 and 42

1122
01:09:34,730 --> 01:09:38,410
was limited solely to supplying
fire support to the Soviet

1123
01:09:38,410 --> 01:09:40,693
forces fighting to defend the city.

1124
01:09:52,340 --> 01:09:55,080
This aspect of the fighting
was also to provide the stage

1125
01:09:55,080 --> 01:10:00,040
for a daring attack led by the
Stukas of Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

1126
01:10:00,040 --> 01:10:01,240
The Luftwaffe was ordered

1127
01:10:01,240 --> 01:10:04,400
to sink the Soviet battleship Marat.

1128
01:10:04,400 --> 01:10:07,530
Rudel managed this amazing
feat in the face of fierce

1129
01:10:07,530 --> 01:10:11,443
anti-aircraft fire with a
single well-placed bomb.

1130
01:10:15,385 --> 01:10:17,320
(waves crashing)

1131
01:10:17,320 --> 01:10:18,640
On the deficit side,

1132
01:10:18,640 --> 01:10:20,990
the 18th army had to
become involved in a number

1133
01:10:20,990 --> 01:10:24,460
of amphibious operations to
capture the Baltic islands,

1134
01:10:24,460 --> 01:10:26,600
which placed a great
strain on what were already

1135
01:10:26,600 --> 01:10:28,573
severely limited resources.

1136
01:10:35,256 --> 01:10:36,949
(weapon blasts)

1137
01:10:36,949 --> 01:10:38,510
(deep boom)

1138
01:10:38,510 --> 01:10:41,300
(fire crackles)

1139
01:10:41,300 --> 01:10:43,400
Throughout the whole course of the war,

1140
01:10:43,400 --> 01:10:46,480
the lack of powerful
reinforcements severely limited

1141
01:10:46,480 --> 01:10:50,120
the strategic options available
for the Army Group command.

1142
01:10:50,120 --> 01:10:53,010
It also required a great
deal of juggling of available

1143
01:10:53,010 --> 01:10:56,730
divisions to maintain the
extended frontline and the siege

1144
01:10:56,730 --> 01:11:00,593
of Leningrad, which was to
drag on for almost three years.

1145
01:11:06,107 --> 01:11:09,107
(people chattering)

1146
01:11:10,930 --> 01:11:13,400
The Germans had closed
right up on the city

1147
01:11:13,400 --> 01:11:18,200
and into the outer suburbs,
but the ring was not closed.

1148
01:11:18,200 --> 01:11:19,450
An important consideration

1149
01:11:19,450 --> 01:11:21,823
at this time was the role of the Fins.

1150
01:11:22,740 --> 01:11:26,230
They agreed to move close to
Leningrad, their fifth general

1151
01:11:26,230 --> 01:11:28,640
Mannerheim making it quite
clear that he was prepared

1152
01:11:28,640 --> 01:11:31,260
to take action to recover
Finnish territory,

1153
01:11:31,260 --> 01:11:34,540
yielded to Russia in
the winter war of 1939,

1154
01:11:34,540 --> 01:11:37,420
but that he would not take
part in the direct attack

1155
01:11:37,420 --> 01:11:39,319
on Leningrad itself.

1156
01:11:39,319 --> 01:11:42,880
(gentle guitar music)

1157
01:11:42,880 --> 01:11:45,200
That was one of the
conditions Finland made

1158
01:11:45,200 --> 01:11:47,230
on entering the war against Russia

1159
01:11:47,230 --> 01:11:48,803
on the side of the Germans.

1160
01:11:49,974 --> 01:11:51,040
Mannerheim was as mindful

1161
01:11:51,040 --> 01:11:53,000
of the political conditions as he was

1162
01:11:53,000 --> 01:11:55,810
of the military conditions
because of Finland's

1163
01:11:55,810 --> 01:11:58,223
vulnerability to future
Russian aggression.

1164
01:11:59,530 --> 01:12:01,870
This meant that the German
and Finnish armies were never

1165
01:12:01,870 --> 01:12:04,270
able to cut off Leningrad completely

1166
01:12:04,270 --> 01:12:06,490
from the rest of the world.

1167
01:12:06,490 --> 01:12:08,310
In both winter and summer,

1168
01:12:08,310 --> 01:12:11,160
the Russian forces were still
able to get resources across

1169
01:12:11,160 --> 01:12:13,823
Lake Ladoga in the Northeast of the city.

1170
01:12:14,970 --> 01:12:17,550
From the winter of 1942 onwards,

1171
01:12:17,550 --> 01:12:20,890
the railway to the East
of Leningrad was completed

1172
01:12:20,890 --> 01:12:24,130
and Leningrad was connected to
the rest of the Soviet union,

1173
01:12:24,130 --> 01:12:26,640
which enabled the forces
to supply the inhabitants

1174
01:12:26,640 --> 01:12:30,113
of the city, helping some of
them to survive the siege.

1175
01:12:34,010 --> 01:12:37,040
The Soviet negotiators in the
Soviet Finnish peace talks,

1176
01:12:37,040 --> 01:12:39,270
which took place in 1944,

1177
01:12:39,270 --> 01:12:42,330
actually recalled that the
Russians recognized what the Fins

1178
01:12:42,330 --> 01:12:43,233
had done for them.

1179
01:12:44,070 --> 01:12:47,840
If the Fins had moved forward
and closed the ring of siege

1180
01:12:47,840 --> 01:12:51,393
around Leningrad, it would've
meant the death of the city.

1181
01:12:54,630 --> 01:12:56,400
Despite the fact that some supplies

1182
01:12:56,400 --> 01:12:59,360
got through, it was precious little.

1183
01:12:59,360 --> 01:13:03,110
Starvation drove the
population to extreme measures,

1184
01:13:03,110 --> 01:13:06,023
including the horrifying
excess of cannibalism.

1185
01:13:07,530 --> 01:13:11,243
The first cases occurred at the
beginning of December, 1941.

1186
01:13:12,180 --> 01:13:14,040
The Soviet criminal code

1187
01:13:14,040 --> 01:13:17,123
made no mention of such
a crime as cannibalism.

1188
01:13:18,040 --> 01:13:21,110
So Soviet officials could at
first only define it as an

1189
01:13:21,110 --> 01:13:23,253
extreme form of banditry.

1190
01:13:24,520 --> 01:13:26,790
According to the top secret
report of the military

1191
01:13:26,790 --> 01:13:30,040
procurator of Leningrad, A. A Kuznetsov,

1192
01:13:30,040 --> 01:13:32,710
dated 27th of February, 1942

1193
01:13:33,690 --> 01:13:36,820
investigations of cannibalism
led to criminal charges

1194
01:13:36,820 --> 01:13:41,110
against 26 individuals in December, 1941,

1195
01:13:41,110 --> 01:13:45,343
366 in January, 1942 and 494

1196
01:13:46,840 --> 01:13:49,843
in the first two weeks of February, 1942.

1197
01:13:51,190 --> 01:13:54,070
Investigation revealed that
not only was human flesh

1198
01:13:54,070 --> 01:13:56,290
consumed by individuals,

1199
01:13:56,290 --> 01:13:58,963
but it was also sold to other citizens.

1200
01:13:59,860 --> 01:14:04,860
By the 20th of February 1942,
866 individuals were under

1201
01:14:04,960 --> 01:14:08,320
criminal investigation
or actual indictment

1202
01:14:08,320 --> 01:14:09,963
for suspected cannibalism.

1203
01:14:11,380 --> 01:14:15,093
Only 18% of this number had
any previous criminal record.

1204
01:14:19,120 --> 01:14:24,120
Of the 886 suspect
individuals, 322 were men

1205
01:14:24,470 --> 01:14:27,490
and 564 women.

1206
01:14:27,490 --> 01:14:31,230
Almost 30% were aged over 40.

1207
01:14:31,230 --> 01:14:33,833
The next largest group
being in their thirties.

1208
01:14:38,600 --> 01:14:39,945
More ghoulish still,

1209
01:14:39,945 --> 01:14:42,630
was the discovery of extensive intrusions

1210
01:14:42,630 --> 01:14:46,093
into cemeteries and the
mutilation of the recent dead.

1211
01:14:47,160 --> 01:14:49,480
One evening in March, 1942,

1212
01:14:49,480 --> 01:14:52,210
the watchman at the Piskaryovskoye
cemetery detained a woman

1213
01:14:52,210 --> 01:14:53,710
with a sack.

1214
01:14:53,710 --> 01:14:58,033
Once opened, the sack revealed
the bodies of five infants.

1215
01:14:59,110 --> 01:15:02,440
The increase in cannibalism
forced the city authorities

1216
01:15:02,440 --> 01:15:06,023
to set up police guards at
all the major cemeteries.

1217
01:15:09,360 --> 01:15:14,063
With the first snows of 1941
came a cruelly bitter winter.

1218
01:15:14,950 --> 01:15:18,050
The temperature continued to
fall and the German soldiers

1219
01:15:18,050 --> 01:15:21,110
now paid dearly for the
arrogance of the high command

1220
01:15:21,110 --> 01:15:23,750
that had refused to admit the
possibility of anything other

1221
01:15:23,750 --> 01:15:25,913
than a quick decisive campaign.

1222
01:15:26,760 --> 01:15:30,860
Few men in the German trenches
had more than summer clothing

1223
01:15:30,860 --> 01:15:33,713
and frostbite took an agonizing tole.

1224
01:15:35,980 --> 01:15:38,490
German machinery and guns
had never been designed

1225
01:15:38,490 --> 01:15:40,800
to function in such extremes.

1226
01:15:40,800 --> 01:15:44,560
Engines seized up, metal
tank tracks split apart

1227
01:15:44,560 --> 01:15:48,140
in the cold, ammunition would not fire.

1228
01:15:48,140 --> 01:15:49,580
The fierceness of the cold

1229
01:15:49,580 --> 01:15:52,633
was far beyond the
experience of most Germans.

1230
01:16:08,980 --> 01:16:11,813
(tank roars past)

1231
01:16:13,870 --> 01:16:14,740
(distant explosions)

1232
01:16:14,740 --> 01:16:17,850
Emboldened by the problems
they saw in the German ranks

1233
01:16:17,850 --> 01:16:20,890
a series of Soviet counterattacks
managed to roll back

1234
01:16:20,890 --> 01:16:24,050
many of the German gains around Leningrad.

1235
01:16:24,050 --> 01:16:25,780
With incredible exertions,

1236
01:16:25,780 --> 01:16:28,373
the Germans kept up a
semblance of defense.

1237
01:16:29,480 --> 01:16:32,530
The tactics of winter warfare
centered around contests

1238
01:16:32,530 --> 01:16:36,560
for the possession of
roads and inhabited places.

1239
01:16:36,560 --> 01:16:38,530
In Russia, villages and roads

1240
01:16:38,530 --> 01:16:40,320
were infinitely more important than they

1241
01:16:40,320 --> 01:16:42,820
were on the rest of the continent.

1242
01:16:42,820 --> 01:16:44,700
In other German theaters of war,

1243
01:16:44,700 --> 01:16:48,710
no one particular road ever
became a crucial factor

1244
01:16:48,710 --> 01:16:50,580
since a well-developed road network

1245
01:16:50,580 --> 01:16:53,500
always offered a choice
of alternate routes.

1246
01:16:53,500 --> 01:16:56,380
In Russia, the possession of a single road

1247
01:16:56,380 --> 01:16:57,590
was often a matter of life

1248
01:16:57,590 --> 01:16:59,673
or death for an entire army.

1249
01:17:00,690 --> 01:17:04,080
The extreme tactical importance
of inhabited places during

1250
01:17:04,080 --> 01:17:07,310
the six months of winter explains
the fact that the Russians

1251
01:17:07,310 --> 01:17:10,460
would frequently much rather
destroy them than surrender

1252
01:17:10,460 --> 01:17:11,360
them to the enemy.

1253
01:17:28,840 --> 01:17:31,820
In the bitter trench
warfare outside Leningrad,

1254
01:17:31,820 --> 01:17:34,720
the defender had a definite
advantage in winter

1255
01:17:34,720 --> 01:17:36,320
because as a rule,

1256
01:17:36,320 --> 01:17:39,000
their positions could
not be seen in the snow,

1257
01:17:39,000 --> 01:17:40,893
except at very close range.

1258
01:17:41,850 --> 01:17:44,870
The defenders were able to
keep their forces undercover

1259
01:17:44,870 --> 01:17:46,710
and wait until the moment their fire

1260
01:17:46,710 --> 01:17:48,303
could be used most effectively.

1261
01:17:49,470 --> 01:17:53,950
The attacker was also
impeded and easily detected

1262
01:17:53,950 --> 01:17:55,573
even in camouflaged clothing.

1263
01:17:58,530 --> 01:18:02,050
The principal weapon of the
defender became the machine gun

1264
01:18:02,050 --> 01:18:05,010
as its performance was
not diminished by snow

1265
01:18:05,010 --> 01:18:07,410
in which mortars and light artillery lost

1266
01:18:07,410 --> 01:18:08,883
most of their effectiveness.

1267
01:18:15,400 --> 01:18:17,680
Replacements were also becoming a problem

1268
01:18:17,680 --> 01:18:19,740
for the German forces.

1269
01:18:19,740 --> 01:18:20,573
After the war,

1270
01:18:20,573 --> 01:18:23,390
it became clear from the
diaries of Army Group North

1271
01:18:23,390 --> 01:18:26,310
that the commanders of both
formations had intentionally

1272
01:18:26,310 --> 01:18:29,210
prohibited, even during calm periods,

1273
01:18:29,210 --> 01:18:32,230
the removal of a unit from
the front in order to grant it

1274
01:18:32,230 --> 01:18:33,930
a period of rest.

1275
01:18:33,930 --> 01:18:37,090
It was better to keep the
divisions at the front and assign

1276
01:18:37,090 --> 01:18:39,160
them to a narrower sector

1277
01:18:39,160 --> 01:18:41,420
as otherwise a reserve unit,

1278
01:18:41,420 --> 01:18:44,120
which had been removed from
the Northern front was certain

1279
01:18:44,120 --> 01:18:47,410
to be taken by the Supreme
command and assigned more

1280
01:18:47,410 --> 01:18:50,290
pressing pressure points
on either the central

1281
01:18:50,290 --> 01:18:51,390
or the Southern front.

1282
01:18:52,607 --> 01:18:53,924
(distant gunfire)

1283
01:18:53,924 --> 01:18:56,740
(loud explosion)

1284
01:18:56,740 --> 01:18:58,860
Although the Northern
front was regarded as being

1285
01:18:58,860 --> 01:19:03,063
of secondary importance, it
was in no sense, a backwater.

1286
01:19:03,900 --> 01:19:06,450
There was still a great deal
of terrible fighting in very

1287
01:19:06,450 --> 01:19:10,530
difficult terrain with
extensive swamps and few roads

1288
01:19:10,530 --> 01:19:13,350
through the vast sections
of trackless forest,

1289
01:19:13,350 --> 01:19:15,623
which presented a logistical nightmare.

1290
01:19:20,530 --> 01:19:23,530
Army group North and the army
divisions were facing the most

1291
01:19:23,530 --> 01:19:26,340
difficult conditions on the Eastern front.

1292
01:19:26,340 --> 01:19:29,640
The climate and the terrain
were completely different.

1293
01:19:29,640 --> 01:19:33,510
Around Leningrad, it is
very marshy and boggy.

1294
01:19:33,510 --> 01:19:35,490
There were also very few roads.

1295
01:19:35,490 --> 01:19:38,743
So all transport logistics
were very difficult indeed.

1296
01:19:51,630 --> 01:19:53,960
To compound the difficulties
for the Germans,

1297
01:19:53,960 --> 01:19:56,140
by October of 1941,

1298
01:19:56,140 --> 01:19:59,270
the first partisan attacks
had begun to cause severe

1299
01:19:59,270 --> 01:20:01,193
difficulties in the rear areas.

1300
01:20:02,190 --> 01:20:04,720
The effects of these attacks
were further compounded

1301
01:20:04,720 --> 01:20:06,170
by the fact that the underdeveloped

1302
01:20:06,170 --> 01:20:07,940
infrastructure of Russia

1303
01:20:07,940 --> 01:20:10,230
meant that there were
very few roads or railways

1304
01:20:10,230 --> 01:20:12,310
which could be used as alternatives

1305
01:20:12,310 --> 01:20:14,863
to those blocked by partisan activity.

1306
01:20:16,660 --> 01:20:19,180
The Russian winter was a nightmare

1307
01:20:19,180 --> 01:20:21,450
along the whole of the front,

1308
01:20:21,450 --> 01:20:23,090
but it was Army Group North

1309
01:20:23,090 --> 01:20:27,260
which bore the brunt of the
most extreme Russian winters.

1310
01:20:27,260 --> 01:20:30,510
It is impossible to
exaggerate the cruel realities

1311
01:20:30,510 --> 01:20:34,013
of fighting in the ferocious
winters of Northern Russia.

1312
01:20:54,070 --> 01:20:55,840
In addition to their geographical

1313
01:20:55,840 --> 01:20:57,560
and climactic difficulties,

1314
01:20:57,560 --> 01:21:01,000
the fighting spirit of the Red
Army facing Army Group North

1315
01:21:01,000 --> 01:21:02,110
was no less intense

1316
01:21:02,110 --> 01:21:04,203
than that displayed on the other sectors.

1317
01:21:05,100 --> 01:21:07,720
The siege of Leningrad
has become synonymous

1318
01:21:07,720 --> 01:21:10,200
with endurance and suffering,

1319
01:21:10,200 --> 01:21:13,190
but there was also a great
deal of intense combat

1320
01:21:13,190 --> 01:21:15,700
as a series of miniature battles rolled

1321
01:21:15,700 --> 01:21:16,870
backwards and forwards

1322
01:21:16,870 --> 01:21:19,233
around the siege lines outside Leningrad.

1323
01:21:20,490 --> 01:21:23,157
(weapon blasts)

1324
01:21:25,668 --> 01:21:28,335
(weapon blasts)

1325
01:21:29,627 --> 01:21:33,157
(distant gunfire)

1326
01:21:33,157 --> 01:21:35,824
(weapon blasts)

1327
01:21:39,320 --> 01:21:41,290
Despite coming very close to victory

1328
01:21:41,290 --> 01:21:43,030
on a number of occasions,

1329
01:21:43,030 --> 01:21:45,580
Army Group North was never
able to close the ring

1330
01:21:45,580 --> 01:21:48,090
around Leningrad completely.

1331
01:21:48,090 --> 01:21:51,270
And the high command continued
to draw desperately needed

1332
01:21:51,270 --> 01:21:54,260
divisions away from the
Army Group North sector,

1333
01:21:54,260 --> 01:21:57,023
in order to feed other
hard-pressed sectors.

1334
01:21:58,150 --> 01:22:01,040
The result of this attrition
from two directions

1335
01:22:01,040 --> 01:22:05,230
was that a ferocious Soviet
offensive in January, 1944,

1336
01:22:05,230 --> 01:22:06,990
finally broke the resistance

1337
01:22:06,990 --> 01:22:10,093
of Army Group North and raised the siege.

1338
01:22:11,360 --> 01:22:15,000
The lifting of the siege
of Leningrad in 1944

1339
01:22:15,000 --> 01:22:16,380
forced Army Group North

1340
01:22:16,380 --> 01:22:19,270
to fall back to a new defensive front

1341
01:22:19,270 --> 01:22:21,730
composed of a series of
partially constructed

1342
01:22:21,730 --> 01:22:24,917
defenses known as "The Panther line".

1343
01:22:25,910 --> 01:22:28,300
This line should have
represented a fallback position

1344
01:22:28,300 --> 01:22:32,823
for the German forces, but work
was beginning much too late.

1345
01:22:39,330 --> 01:22:42,180
The Panther line was envisaged
as a series of strong

1346
01:22:42,180 --> 01:22:45,770
fortifications incorporating
parts of the Northern regions

1347
01:22:45,770 --> 01:22:48,890
of the Soviet union in a
line running Southwards

1348
01:22:48,890 --> 01:22:51,860
from Lake Dvina and Lake Pscov

1349
01:22:51,860 --> 01:22:53,120
near the town of Nava

1350
01:22:53,120 --> 01:22:54,823
on the Baltic coast of Estonia.

1351
01:22:55,890 --> 01:22:57,980
It was envisaged that the German troops

1352
01:22:57,980 --> 01:23:00,020
retreating behind the line

1353
01:23:00,020 --> 01:23:03,133
would occupy a series of
excellent defensive points.

1354
01:23:04,170 --> 01:23:06,210
The German troops would
therefore have a respite

1355
01:23:06,210 --> 01:23:07,850
from the rigors of the retreat

1356
01:23:07,850 --> 01:23:10,313
and be able to hold
the Soviet army at bay.

1357
01:23:17,360 --> 01:23:19,590
Meanwhile, the armored formations

1358
01:23:19,590 --> 01:23:21,710
and the air formations of the German army

1359
01:23:21,710 --> 01:23:25,480
were repaired and returned
to the fray to renew combat

1360
01:23:25,480 --> 01:23:27,800
with their Soviet foes.

1361
01:23:27,800 --> 01:23:29,680
However, the Panther line

1362
01:23:29,680 --> 01:23:31,930
was constructed merely as an afterthought

1363
01:23:31,930 --> 01:23:33,293
when it was much too late.

1364
01:23:34,270 --> 01:23:36,480
The German armies had suffered defeats

1365
01:23:36,480 --> 01:23:37,530
and simply did not have

1366
01:23:37,530 --> 01:23:39,943
enough troops to man the line effectively.

1367
01:23:40,930 --> 01:23:43,010
In those areas where adequate defenses

1368
01:23:43,010 --> 01:23:44,660
had been prepared in the line

1369
01:23:44,660 --> 01:23:46,110
and there were sufficient German troops

1370
01:23:46,110 --> 01:23:47,790
and aircraft available,

1371
01:23:47,790 --> 01:23:49,840
it proved a very formidable obstacle

1372
01:23:49,840 --> 01:23:51,583
for the Soviet army to overcome.

1373
01:23:52,470 --> 01:23:54,430
Had it been properly prepared

1374
01:23:54,430 --> 01:23:57,800
as part of a coherent
overall strategic plan,

1375
01:23:57,800 --> 01:24:00,305
the Panther line could have been held.

1376
01:24:00,305 --> 01:24:03,305
(suspenseful music)

1377
01:24:12,050 --> 01:24:14,800
The Panther line was only ever
going to provide a temporary

1378
01:24:14,800 --> 01:24:17,973
solution to the mounting
problems of Army Group North.

1379
01:24:19,000 --> 01:24:21,960
The destruction of the
neighboring Army Group Center

1380
01:24:21,960 --> 01:24:23,940
in June, 1944,

1381
01:24:23,940 --> 01:24:27,790
tore a huge gap in the German
lines and left the right flank

1382
01:24:27,790 --> 01:24:31,203
of Army Group North
vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

1383
01:24:35,220 --> 01:24:39,570
Hitler was forced to sanction
another series of withdrawals.

1384
01:24:39,570 --> 01:24:41,840
From the Panther line, Army Group North

1385
01:24:41,840 --> 01:24:44,610
were forced to retreat
in relatively good order

1386
01:24:44,610 --> 01:24:48,180
towards Germany fighting a
series of ferocious defensive

1387
01:24:48,180 --> 01:24:50,010
battles as they went.

1388
01:24:50,010 --> 01:24:51,750
The most notable of these being

1389
01:24:51,750 --> 01:24:54,103
the defense of Nava in 1944.

1390
01:24:58,540 --> 01:25:01,130
The battle for Narva plays
a very important part

1391
01:25:01,130 --> 01:25:02,950
in the Soviet German war

1392
01:25:02,950 --> 01:25:06,540
because Narva is the gateway to Estonia.

1393
01:25:06,540 --> 01:25:10,290
The Germans recognized the
importance of holding Narva.

1394
01:25:10,290 --> 01:25:12,730
And there were initially
12 divisions organized

1395
01:25:12,730 --> 01:25:14,680
into what was called "Abteilung Narwa",

1396
01:25:15,560 --> 01:25:17,310
a special force grouping,

1397
01:25:17,310 --> 01:25:20,393
which was to fight with enormous
courage and distinction.

1398
01:25:26,930 --> 01:25:31,050
The defense of Narva was a
bitterly fought encounter.

1399
01:25:31,050 --> 01:25:33,470
A breakthrough here would have compromised

1400
01:25:33,470 --> 01:25:35,710
many German troops in the Baltic regions

1401
01:25:35,710 --> 01:25:38,190
of Estonia and Latvia.

1402
01:25:38,190 --> 01:25:40,760
European SS, along with the German

1403
01:25:40,760 --> 01:25:43,090
regular army divisions managed to hold

1404
01:25:43,090 --> 01:25:45,840
back the forces of the
Soviet Leningrad front

1405
01:25:45,840 --> 01:25:49,630
throughout January, February, and March.

1406
01:25:49,630 --> 01:25:53,230
Their bitter attritional
contest was not characterized

1407
01:25:53,230 --> 01:25:55,800
by sophisticated tactical maneuvers.

1408
01:25:55,800 --> 01:25:57,653
It was a bloody slugging-match.

1409
01:26:05,327 --> 01:26:08,160
(distant gunfire)

1410
01:26:12,948 --> 01:26:15,615
(weapon blasts)

1411
01:26:17,770 --> 01:26:21,370
The German formations were
saved by the early spring thaw

1412
01:26:21,370 --> 01:26:23,740
of late March, 1944,

1413
01:26:23,740 --> 01:26:28,020
which produced seas of mud
floods of at least one foot deep

1414
01:26:28,020 --> 01:26:31,720
in an area of 100 to 140 miles square.

1415
01:26:31,720 --> 01:26:35,940
Even Soviet tanks stuck
fast in the torrents of mud

1416
01:26:35,940 --> 01:26:39,263
and the German forces were
able to retreat once more.

1417
01:26:45,410 --> 01:26:48,880
The incredible resistance
offered by Army Group Narva,

1418
01:26:48,880 --> 01:26:51,520
a scratch formation drawn
from the slender resources

1419
01:26:51,520 --> 01:26:53,040
of Army Group North

1420
01:26:53,040 --> 01:26:54,860
represents an impressive example

1421
01:26:54,860 --> 01:26:56,800
of military improvisation

1422
01:26:56,800 --> 01:26:58,470
and stands comparison with the other

1423
01:26:58,470 --> 01:27:00,760
German defensive battles fought elsewhere

1424
01:27:00,760 --> 01:27:02,363
in Russia and Italy.

1425
01:27:03,580 --> 01:27:07,530
The mainstay of resistance in
Narva was the third SS Panzer

1426
01:27:07,530 --> 01:27:11,850
Corps, which included the long
serving SS police division

1427
01:27:11,850 --> 01:27:14,670
along with the new SS Viking division

1428
01:27:14,670 --> 01:27:18,042
comprised of volunteers from
different nationalities.

1429
01:27:18,042 --> 01:27:20,709
(rapid gunfire)

1430
01:27:23,900 --> 01:27:26,080
By October, 1944,

1431
01:27:26,080 --> 01:27:27,580
the situation around Narva

1432
01:27:27,580 --> 01:27:30,570
from a German point of view, was hopeless.

1433
01:27:30,570 --> 01:27:33,820
But unlike the countless
garrisons squandered by Hitler

1434
01:27:33,820 --> 01:27:37,770
in a pointless series of
hold-at-all-costs orders,

1435
01:27:37,770 --> 01:27:40,270
Army Group Narva managed to escape

1436
01:27:40,270 --> 01:27:42,543
and rejoin Army Group North.

1437
01:27:45,130 --> 01:27:48,660
Constant retreat was now the
order of the day as the army

1438
01:27:48,660 --> 01:27:49,770
group was driven back

1439
01:27:49,770 --> 01:27:52,093
through the Baltic States towards Germany.

1440
01:27:52,940 --> 01:27:55,883
But Army Group North
would never make it home.

1441
01:27:57,062 --> 01:28:00,229
(gentle guitar music)

1442
01:28:05,260 --> 01:28:07,950
While the Red Army
rolled on towards Berlin,

1443
01:28:07,950 --> 01:28:10,270
the men of Army Group
North were finally cornered

1444
01:28:10,270 --> 01:28:12,703
in the Courland peninsula of Latvia.

1445
01:28:13,770 --> 01:28:15,320
There, the battered remnants

1446
01:28:15,320 --> 01:28:17,120
of the Army Group held off all attacks

1447
01:28:17,120 --> 01:28:19,720
by the Red Army for six long months.

1448
01:28:19,720 --> 01:28:21,900
They were under siege from late October,

1449
01:28:21,900 --> 01:28:24,783
1944 through to May, 1945.

1450
01:28:31,230 --> 01:28:33,897
(weapon blasts)

1451
01:28:34,851 --> 01:28:37,518
(weapon blasts)

1452
01:28:39,053 --> 01:28:41,720
(rapid gunfire)

1453
01:28:57,990 --> 01:29:00,950
In January, 1945, the two armies,

1454
01:29:00,950 --> 01:29:04,800
which had served since
1941 as Army Group North

1455
01:29:04,800 --> 01:29:07,303
were renamed Army Group Courland.

1456
01:29:08,750 --> 01:29:11,130
The hard-won mantle of Army Group North

1457
01:29:11,130 --> 01:29:13,180
was transferred to a scratch assembly

1458
01:29:13,180 --> 01:29:15,580
of beaten units under the command

1459
01:29:15,580 --> 01:29:18,690
of a swift succession
of temporary leaders.

1460
01:29:18,690 --> 01:29:21,100
The spirit of the men of Army Group North

1461
01:29:21,100 --> 01:29:23,763
remained behind in Courland.

1462
01:29:24,713 --> 01:29:27,380
(ominous music)

1463
01:29:49,041 --> 01:29:49,980
(distant blasts)

1464
01:29:49,980 --> 01:29:50,950
The German divisions,

1465
01:29:50,950 --> 01:29:52,630
which found their way to Courland

1466
01:29:52,630 --> 01:29:54,260
were stuck there.

1467
01:29:54,260 --> 01:29:56,750
They were blockaded by the
Russians and there was nothing

1468
01:29:56,750 --> 01:29:57,990
they could do.

1469
01:29:57,990 --> 01:30:00,310
They could no longer make
any useful contribution

1470
01:30:00,310 --> 01:30:02,653
to the greater course
of the war elsewhere.

1471
01:30:03,510 --> 01:30:04,850
In many respects,

1472
01:30:04,850 --> 01:30:07,210
it was a very wasteful and irresponsible

1473
01:30:07,210 --> 01:30:09,103
gesture on the part of Hitler.

1474
01:30:10,130 --> 01:30:14,430
This albeit scratch army was
still a considerable force,

1475
01:30:14,430 --> 01:30:17,630
which could have made a
valuable contribution elsewhere,

1476
01:30:17,630 --> 01:30:19,430
but it was not to be made available.

1477
01:30:21,941 --> 01:30:25,024
(distant explosions)

1478
01:30:34,210 --> 01:30:36,310
Despite everything that
the besieged Red Army

1479
01:30:36,310 --> 01:30:37,410
could throw at them,

1480
01:30:37,410 --> 01:30:40,870
the surviving elements of
the 16th and 18th armies

1481
01:30:40,870 --> 01:30:43,350
now officially known
as Army Group Courland

1482
01:30:43,350 --> 01:30:46,020
continued to resist all further attempts

1483
01:30:46,020 --> 01:30:47,503
to force them into surrender.

1484
01:30:48,720 --> 01:30:52,560
Fighting for the Courland
peninsula was grinding in nature.

1485
01:30:52,560 --> 01:30:55,020
It was not like the
Western and Eastern fronts

1486
01:30:55,020 --> 01:30:57,180
characterized by large formations,

1487
01:30:57,180 --> 01:31:00,060
sweeping along the frontier
and impressive sophisticated

1488
01:31:00,060 --> 01:31:03,950
operations, in the Courland
fighting, the Germans

1489
01:31:03,950 --> 01:31:06,900
trapped in this region
were gradually, slowly

1490
01:31:06,900 --> 01:31:08,440
and surely pushed back

1491
01:31:08,440 --> 01:31:10,980
in spectacular fashion into something

1492
01:31:10,980 --> 01:31:14,043
of a geographical
cul-de-sac by the Red Army.

1493
01:31:30,787 --> 01:31:34,060
(waves crashing)

1494
01:31:34,060 --> 01:31:36,930
They were well served to
the bitter end by the ships

1495
01:31:36,930 --> 01:31:38,500
of the Kriegsmarine

1496
01:31:38,500 --> 01:31:40,470
who managed to evacuate some divisions

1497
01:31:40,470 --> 01:31:42,010
recalled to Germany.

1498
01:31:42,010 --> 01:31:44,150
On occasion, they even managed to bring in

1499
01:31:44,150 --> 01:31:46,173
some much needed reinforcements.

1500
01:31:47,860 --> 01:31:50,750
The German Navy did have
an important role to play

1501
01:31:50,750 --> 01:31:52,580
when the Red Army began to advance

1502
01:31:52,580 --> 01:31:56,320
along the Baltic coast to
break into East Prussia,

1503
01:31:56,320 --> 01:31:58,950
because if at all possible the German Navy

1504
01:31:58,950 --> 01:32:02,123
had to try and contain
Soviet Naval operations.

1505
01:32:02,980 --> 01:32:04,660
Even more importantly,

1506
01:32:04,660 --> 01:32:06,630
they had a grievous burden,

1507
01:32:06,630 --> 01:32:09,807
to try and evacuate as many
of the German civilians

1508
01:32:09,807 --> 01:32:11,310
and German military units

1509
01:32:11,310 --> 01:32:13,870
who had been trapped
and transport them back

1510
01:32:13,870 --> 01:32:15,855
into German territory.

1511
01:32:15,855 --> 01:32:18,855
(suspenseful music)

1512
01:32:23,133 --> 01:32:26,300
(airplane roars past)

1513
01:32:35,530 --> 01:32:38,440
The Naval aspect in the
closing stage of the war

1514
01:32:38,440 --> 01:32:40,510
does demonstrate that the German Navy

1515
01:32:40,510 --> 01:32:43,890
could operate well even
in the face of disaster,

1516
01:32:43,890 --> 01:32:45,263
which was now pending.

1517
01:32:50,530 --> 01:32:54,170
The Kriegsmarine was absolutely
vital in explaining why

1518
01:32:54,170 --> 01:32:56,010
German formations fought bitterly

1519
01:32:56,010 --> 01:32:57,630
to the end for the pointless

1520
01:32:57,630 --> 01:33:00,260
battle for the Courland peninsula.

1521
01:33:00,260 --> 01:33:02,810
The peninsula, from the
Army's point of view

1522
01:33:02,810 --> 01:33:04,970
was militarily useless,

1523
01:33:04,970 --> 01:33:09,970
indeed many German commanders
in late 1944 and spring 1945

1524
01:33:10,350 --> 01:33:11,740
constantly requested Hitler

1525
01:33:11,740 --> 01:33:13,623
to give up the Courland peninsula.

1526
01:33:14,660 --> 01:33:16,770
This would release the 26 divisions

1527
01:33:16,770 --> 01:33:18,070
that were fighting there

1528
01:33:18,070 --> 01:33:20,460
in order to bolster their defense in what

1529
01:33:20,460 --> 01:33:23,093
were more important military
regions nearer to home.

1530
01:33:33,235 --> 01:33:36,235
(distant explosion)

1531
01:33:39,131 --> 01:33:41,798
(rapid gunfire)

1532
01:33:46,440 --> 01:33:49,050
The German Navy had used
the Baltic sea throughout

1533
01:33:49,050 --> 01:33:51,540
World War Two as a training ground

1534
01:33:51,540 --> 01:33:54,216
for its submarine commanders.

1535
01:33:54,216 --> 01:33:56,060
Donitz, a committed Nazi

1536
01:33:56,060 --> 01:33:58,570
who was in charge of
the Navy at this stage,

1537
01:33:58,570 --> 01:34:01,370
regarded the retention of the
Gulf of Danzig in the Baltic

1538
01:34:01,370 --> 01:34:05,570
sea as essential in order to
train his submarine commanders

1539
01:34:05,570 --> 01:34:10,570
to use the extremely powerful
new submarine, the type 21,

1540
01:34:10,840 --> 01:34:12,680
which the German Navy were developing

1541
01:34:12,680 --> 01:34:14,103
towards the end of the war.

1542
01:34:15,050 --> 01:34:17,870
The Kriegsmarine therefore
played a critical role in

1543
01:34:17,870 --> 01:34:21,300
explaining why the German
formations fought so bitterly for

1544
01:34:21,300 --> 01:34:23,577
the Courland peninsula.

1545
01:34:23,577 --> 01:34:26,827
(weapon fires rapidly)

1546
01:34:55,240 --> 01:34:57,740
Trapped in Courland, the survivors

1547
01:34:57,740 --> 01:34:59,670
of the old Army Group North

1548
01:34:59,670 --> 01:35:03,150
maintained their cohesion
and fighting ability

1549
01:35:03,150 --> 01:35:06,383
until the final surrender
on may the eighth, 1945,

1550
01:35:07,710 --> 01:35:11,343
almost four years since they
had first moved into Russia.

1551
01:35:12,500 --> 01:35:16,620
On that day 203,000 men
began the long march

1552
01:35:16,620 --> 01:35:18,780
into Soviet captivity.

1553
01:35:18,780 --> 01:35:20,850
Many would never return.

1554
01:35:20,850 --> 01:35:23,800
And others were held as
slave laborers until 1955,

1555
01:35:25,210 --> 01:35:28,563
a high price to pay
for their long defense.

1556
01:35:34,060 --> 01:35:37,420
Of the three huge army groups
which Hitler sent into Russia,

1557
01:35:37,420 --> 01:35:40,300
it could be argued that Army
Group North was the most

1558
01:35:40,300 --> 01:35:44,040
successful in carrying out
the tasks assigned to it.

1559
01:35:44,040 --> 01:35:47,410
Although the campaign ultimately
ended in failure for them,

1560
01:35:47,410 --> 01:35:51,640
the men of Army Group North
retained their military cohesion

1561
01:35:51,640 --> 01:35:54,820
with some units achieving the
rare distinction of serving

1562
01:35:54,820 --> 01:35:56,520
for the whole four years

1563
01:35:56,520 --> 01:36:00,963
of the Russian war in the same army group.

1564
01:36:15,018 --> 01:36:17,685
(ominous music)