1 00:00:00,312 --> 00:00:02,512 (cow mooing) (glass breaking) 2 00:00:02,000 --> 00:00:07,000 Downloaded from YTS.MX 3 00:00:02,512 --> 00:00:05,512 (crickets chirping) 4 00:00:08,000 --> 00:00:13,000 Official YIFY movies site: YTS.MX 5 00:00:11,211 --> 00:00:13,794 (somber music) 6 00:00:40,112 --> 00:00:42,612 (guns firing) 7 00:01:02,990 --> 00:01:05,373 - So we entered this room. 8 00:01:06,240 --> 00:01:10,190 Around the table were perhaps a dozen visitors, 9 00:01:10,190 --> 00:01:11,923 most of them military, 10 00:01:13,270 --> 00:01:15,940 mentioning that I had recently been 11 00:01:15,940 --> 00:01:19,013 an advisor at the province level in South Vietnam. 12 00:01:20,010 --> 00:01:21,792 People stopped and looked at me 13 00:01:21,792 --> 00:01:25,180 and one said I've always wondered 14 00:01:25,180 --> 00:01:27,073 what happens at the province level? 15 00:01:28,323 --> 00:01:30,656 (low music) 16 00:01:46,020 --> 00:01:48,180 The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 17 00:01:48,180 --> 00:01:50,683 remind me of the issues we faced back then. 18 00:01:53,210 --> 00:01:55,910 We just didn't know who to trust among the Vietnamese. 19 00:01:59,700 --> 00:02:02,150 Who were the sympathizers and who were the enemy? 20 00:02:04,360 --> 00:02:05,553 Who could you believe? 21 00:02:08,639 --> 00:02:12,143 US military saw this as an organizational problem. 22 00:02:18,070 --> 00:02:19,240 They thought it could be solved 23 00:02:19,240 --> 00:02:22,273 by reorganizing the way the Vietnamese fought the war. 24 00:02:26,760 --> 00:02:28,360 The US had developed a system 25 00:02:28,360 --> 00:02:30,463 for coordinating intelligence collection, 26 00:02:32,760 --> 00:02:35,730 but America didn't wanna be viewed as a colonial ruler 27 00:02:35,730 --> 00:02:37,993 forcing its policies on Vietnam. 28 00:02:40,350 --> 00:02:43,930 Our orders were to persuade our Vietnamese counterparts 29 00:02:43,930 --> 00:02:46,603 to implement this system at the province level. 30 00:02:48,290 --> 00:02:51,280 As if that would overcome the lack of motivation, 31 00:02:51,280 --> 00:02:53,690 lack of will, and lack of honesty 32 00:02:53,690 --> 00:02:55,223 in the Vietnamese military. 33 00:02:56,960 --> 00:02:58,760 We couldn't get them to do anything. 34 00:03:00,560 --> 00:03:02,477 We weren't trained to deal with the Vietnamese people 35 00:03:02,477 --> 00:03:04,230 and their traditions. 36 00:03:04,230 --> 00:03:06,533 Our military leaders didn't seem interested. 37 00:03:08,200 --> 00:03:10,470 But we had unlimited faith in organization 38 00:03:10,470 --> 00:03:12,623 and bureaucracy as tools of war. 39 00:03:15,760 --> 00:03:18,620 That lead to a breakdown of communication 40 00:03:18,620 --> 00:03:20,860 between those of us at the province level 41 00:03:20,860 --> 00:03:23,436 and those planning the war from higher up. 42 00:03:23,436 --> 00:03:26,186 (low rock music) 43 00:03:56,310 --> 00:03:59,680 How does the typical American in the early 1960s 44 00:03:59,680 --> 00:04:01,433 wind up in Vietnam? 45 00:04:04,030 --> 00:04:08,440 I agreed to go into the Army in May of 1966. 46 00:04:10,320 --> 00:04:15,090 And I was commissioned and went to Fort Benning, Georgia 47 00:04:15,090 --> 00:04:17,043 for infantry school training. 48 00:04:18,149 --> 00:04:21,260 The culmination of the infantry training 49 00:04:21,260 --> 00:04:23,082 was escape and evasion: 50 00:04:23,960 --> 00:04:26,893 what to do if we were captured by the enemy. 51 00:04:30,260 --> 00:04:33,153 At a predetermined point, you were allowed to escape. 52 00:04:34,220 --> 00:04:39,159 Your job was to find your way back to safe haven, 53 00:04:39,159 --> 00:04:42,110 and to do that you were supposed to not get captured again. 54 00:04:44,030 --> 00:04:45,210 Well I think I was the only one 55 00:04:45,210 --> 00:04:48,082 who got captured twice on the way trying to get back. 56 00:04:56,988 --> 00:05:00,155 Next was combat intelligence training. 57 00:05:05,871 --> 00:05:10,871 How to identify the enemy, how to classify them, 58 00:05:10,900 --> 00:05:13,210 how to collect intelligence about them, 59 00:05:13,210 --> 00:05:16,100 and put them into some kind of analysis 60 00:05:16,100 --> 00:05:17,897 of what was going on. 61 00:05:17,897 --> 00:05:21,147 (low electronic music) 62 00:05:26,290 --> 00:05:30,340 In August or so of 1966, this was still based 63 00:05:30,340 --> 00:05:34,350 upon the Korean War and so we had maps 64 00:05:34,350 --> 00:05:38,500 with information about large units moving here and there, 65 00:05:38,500 --> 00:05:41,380 and it really had very little relevance 66 00:05:41,380 --> 00:05:44,313 to what we were going to find in South Vietnam. 67 00:05:46,650 --> 00:05:49,090 And my own view on the Vietnam War 68 00:05:49,090 --> 00:05:53,170 was that the worst I thought it might've been misguided, 69 00:05:53,170 --> 00:05:55,973 but I couldn't conclude that it was immoral. 70 00:05:57,550 --> 00:06:00,020 That there was some justification 71 00:06:00,020 --> 00:06:03,940 for assisting a nation that was resisting a takeover 72 00:06:03,940 --> 00:06:06,293 even if it were kind of a civil war. 73 00:06:07,876 --> 00:06:11,126 (low electronic music) 74 00:06:12,360 --> 00:06:16,293 Midway through the training, we got our orders. 75 00:06:17,296 --> 00:06:19,963 (ominous music) 76 00:06:23,710 --> 00:06:28,503 The Army had designated for South Vietnam the Four Corps. 77 00:06:32,180 --> 00:06:34,497 I Corps ran along the DMZ. 78 00:06:38,760 --> 00:06:42,250 II Corps was central highlands to the west 79 00:06:42,250 --> 00:06:44,483 and then the coast on the east. 80 00:06:47,350 --> 00:06:50,733 III Corps was the area around Saigon. 81 00:06:52,360 --> 00:06:56,483 And then IV Corps was the Mekong Delta area. 82 00:06:57,845 --> 00:07:01,720 II Corps was where I wound up being sent, 83 00:07:01,720 --> 00:07:06,720 in the province of Ninh Thuan and in the town of Phan Rang. 84 00:07:09,160 --> 00:07:11,500 And there I was assigned to be part 85 00:07:11,500 --> 00:07:14,540 of Advisory Team Number 39, 86 00:07:14,540 --> 00:07:17,947 Military Assistance Command Vietnam, the MACV. 87 00:07:19,122 --> 00:07:21,455 (low music) 88 00:07:41,610 --> 00:07:45,930 We were there as advisors who worked in parallel 89 00:07:45,930 --> 00:07:48,380 with the Vietnamese officers 90 00:07:48,380 --> 00:07:52,393 who were in charge of that province, the ARVN. 91 00:07:55,300 --> 00:07:57,790 A kind of parallel military structure 92 00:07:57,790 --> 00:08:00,263 to that of the South Vietnamese military. 93 00:08:04,380 --> 00:08:08,760 So you had a commanding officer at the corps level 94 00:08:08,760 --> 00:08:13,283 who advised the commanding general of the ARVN unit. 95 00:08:14,830 --> 00:08:17,890 And then on down the line with various officers, 96 00:08:17,890 --> 00:08:19,540 including what we would be 97 00:08:19,540 --> 00:08:23,983 which were the staff intelligence officers, the S2. 98 00:08:27,520 --> 00:08:31,020 So that you really had no true civilian leadership anymore, 99 00:08:31,020 --> 00:08:34,198 it was all based on a military structure. 100 00:08:34,198 --> 00:08:35,399 (camera shutter closing) 101 00:08:35,399 --> 00:08:38,232 (soft drum music) 102 00:08:42,740 --> 00:08:45,440 One of our tasks in the intelligence business 103 00:08:45,440 --> 00:08:49,261 was to observe the province that we were in. 104 00:08:49,261 --> 00:08:52,094 (soft drum music) 105 00:08:57,090 --> 00:09:00,380 The guerrilla warfare primarily consisted 106 00:09:00,380 --> 00:09:04,293 of Viet Cong units, often in the mountain areas. 107 00:09:10,070 --> 00:09:12,750 They would come down from wherever they were hiding 108 00:09:12,750 --> 00:09:14,919 and enter hamlets. 109 00:09:14,919 --> 00:09:17,752 (soft drum music) 110 00:09:23,100 --> 00:09:27,350 We would get reports overnight about these episodes 111 00:09:27,350 --> 00:09:30,140 and then set up ambushes. 112 00:09:30,140 --> 00:09:32,473 (low music) 113 00:09:42,060 --> 00:09:46,623 I was part of the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion. 114 00:09:47,781 --> 00:09:50,114 (low music) 115 00:09:53,800 --> 00:09:56,780 The intelligence corps was not part 116 00:09:56,780 --> 00:09:58,993 of the regular army unit, 117 00:09:59,870 --> 00:10:04,103 and we were assigned to these advisory teams. 118 00:10:09,730 --> 00:10:14,450 We had dual loyalties, one was through the American stream 119 00:10:14,450 --> 00:10:16,223 of intelligence collection, 120 00:10:17,410 --> 00:10:20,433 and the other was working with the Vietnamese military. 121 00:10:24,560 --> 00:10:27,740 We would spend part of the day doing our own analysis, 122 00:10:27,740 --> 00:10:32,210 writing our own reports for the US military, 123 00:10:32,210 --> 00:10:36,123 and then meeting with our Vietnamese counterparts. 124 00:10:40,500 --> 00:10:42,950 We were supposed to help the Vietnamese 125 00:10:42,950 --> 00:10:46,223 understand the information that they were collecting. 126 00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:51,500 Here I was, a 23-year-old 127 00:10:51,500 --> 00:10:54,493 with about six weeks of intelligence training. 128 00:10:57,310 --> 00:11:01,570 My counterpart, the senior Vietnamese intelligence officer, 129 00:11:01,570 --> 00:11:05,163 had been in the business for at least 10 years. 130 00:11:06,590 --> 00:11:09,720 The idea that we could teach them much (laughs) 131 00:11:09,720 --> 00:11:12,303 was a bit presumptuous. 132 00:11:13,259 --> 00:11:15,842 (somber music) 133 00:11:42,169 --> 00:11:43,780 I used to go into these hamlets 134 00:11:43,780 --> 00:11:46,270 and I would hear sometimes the children 135 00:11:46,270 --> 00:11:49,020 sometimes the women saying (speaking foreign language). 136 00:11:52,280 --> 00:11:54,550 My interpreter told me (speaking foreign language) 137 00:11:54,550 --> 00:11:56,508 stood for lieutenant. 138 00:11:56,508 --> 00:11:59,343 (speaking foreign language) meant very big, 139 00:12:00,480 --> 00:12:03,070 maybe very fat, it wasn't too clear 140 00:12:03,070 --> 00:12:06,330 what exactly that meant. 141 00:12:06,330 --> 00:12:07,610 That was what I was worried about, 142 00:12:07,610 --> 00:12:11,730 and so I said to him well, I said, I've gotta do something, 143 00:12:11,730 --> 00:12:15,169 but I said what's the word for handsome? 144 00:12:15,169 --> 00:12:18,197 (laughs) And he said well (speaking foreign language). 145 00:12:20,210 --> 00:12:24,228 So after that, whenever I'd hear somebody say 146 00:12:24,228 --> 00:12:25,857 (speaking foreign language) I'd say, 147 00:12:25,857 --> 00:12:28,993 (speaking foreign language) which would, 148 00:12:30,250 --> 00:12:32,293 they thought was hilarious of course. 149 00:12:36,680 --> 00:12:39,790 There was a great deal of friendliness on the part 150 00:12:39,790 --> 00:12:43,330 of most of the Vietnamese people for the Americans. 151 00:12:43,330 --> 00:12:45,990 Even by people who might otherwise 152 00:12:45,990 --> 00:12:50,113 have been under the threat of Viet Cong retaliation. 153 00:12:51,088 --> 00:12:53,671 (somber music) 154 00:13:04,730 --> 00:13:08,090 But even with the Vietnamese military forces, 155 00:13:08,090 --> 00:13:12,420 there was a dichotomy between the true believers 156 00:13:12,420 --> 00:13:14,810 in the cause for resisting 157 00:13:14,810 --> 00:13:18,310 what they saw as Communist takeover, 158 00:13:18,310 --> 00:13:20,820 and others who were willing to deal 159 00:13:20,820 --> 00:13:24,396 with the Viet Cong or with their sympathizers. 160 00:13:24,396 --> 00:13:26,979 (somber music) 161 00:13:41,140 --> 00:13:45,720 The Regional Forces and the Popular Forces 162 00:13:45,720 --> 00:13:48,620 effectively, well they weren't very effective, 163 00:13:48,620 --> 00:13:52,020 but they were a National Guard kind of unit, 164 00:13:52,020 --> 00:13:55,690 very little training, some of them with no training at all, 165 00:13:55,690 --> 00:13:58,743 often with very old, inadequate weapons. 166 00:14:01,690 --> 00:14:03,970 There would be a small group of men, 167 00:14:03,970 --> 00:14:08,970 sometimes elderly men, who would take turns at night 168 00:14:09,270 --> 00:14:12,023 and guard the hamlet from intruders. 169 00:14:12,990 --> 00:14:16,363 Sometimes they were successful, oftentimes they were not. 170 00:14:19,300 --> 00:14:23,660 A small group of these Popular Force people, 171 00:14:23,660 --> 00:14:27,960 they had seen an ARVN, an army truck, headed towards an area 172 00:14:27,960 --> 00:14:30,383 that we considered Viet Cong controlled. 173 00:14:32,000 --> 00:14:35,973 They stopped the truck and were holding it and the driver. 174 00:14:38,200 --> 00:14:43,200 And in the truck was a load of American medical supplies. 175 00:14:43,923 --> 00:14:46,506 (somber music) 176 00:14:51,370 --> 00:14:54,380 These Popular Force people were offered 177 00:14:54,380 --> 00:14:57,130 more money than they would ever see in their lives 178 00:14:57,130 --> 00:15:01,603 by the driver to just forget about this and let him go on. 179 00:15:03,110 --> 00:15:07,453 And they refused and they held them until we arrived. 180 00:15:09,900 --> 00:15:14,190 Tracing back the origins of this truck 181 00:15:15,500 --> 00:15:18,840 we found that it had been under the command 182 00:15:18,840 --> 00:15:23,170 of the operations officer in the Vietnamese army 183 00:15:23,170 --> 00:15:26,350 who was part of the province structure. 184 00:15:26,350 --> 00:15:28,750 The man that it was generally agreed 185 00:15:28,750 --> 00:15:33,440 was the most effective officer in their whole organization. 186 00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:36,910 He was considered to be the kind of person 187 00:15:36,910 --> 00:15:38,210 we could really work with. 188 00:15:41,100 --> 00:15:45,650 What all this meant was that he was, 189 00:15:45,650 --> 00:15:49,030 at the very least, willing to sell 190 00:15:49,030 --> 00:15:51,573 these medical supplies to the Viet Cong. 191 00:15:53,370 --> 00:15:56,660 Now here were these Popular Forces folks 192 00:15:56,660 --> 00:15:59,360 who took this great risk to their own lives 193 00:15:59,360 --> 00:16:02,830 and at the cost of a very lucrative pay off 194 00:16:02,830 --> 00:16:04,393 in support of the cause, 195 00:16:05,300 --> 00:16:09,560 and here is this army officer who is highly admired 196 00:16:09,560 --> 00:16:13,628 and aggressive, who may be the one betraying it. 197 00:16:13,628 --> 00:16:16,545 (triumphant music) 198 00:16:22,950 --> 00:16:23,783 - [Announcer] The Central Highlands, 199 00:16:23,783 --> 00:16:26,750 the Trường Sơn cordillera, are a mountainous, 200 00:16:26,750 --> 00:16:30,170 largely jungle-covered region military strategists 201 00:16:30,170 --> 00:16:32,570 on both sides of this struggle are agreed 202 00:16:32,570 --> 00:16:34,660 that he who gains the highlands 203 00:16:34,660 --> 00:16:37,223 will have won the fight for Vietnam. 204 00:16:38,800 --> 00:16:40,960 Villages of the highlands are inhabited 205 00:16:40,960 --> 00:16:44,190 by many races known to the outside world 206 00:16:44,190 --> 00:16:47,760 by the French term Montagnards, or mountain people. 207 00:16:47,760 --> 00:16:49,140 They are known to themselves 208 00:16:49,140 --> 00:16:51,603 by such tribal names as Rade and M'nong. 209 00:16:53,090 --> 00:16:55,940 Are vastly different from the light-skinned lowlanders 210 00:16:55,940 --> 00:16:57,983 whom the world knows as Vietnamese. 211 00:16:59,500 --> 00:17:00,850 Through these mountain villages 212 00:17:00,850 --> 00:17:02,510 for more than a decade have passed 213 00:17:02,510 --> 00:17:04,990 increasing numbers of Communist guerrillas. 214 00:17:04,990 --> 00:17:09,310 The Montagnard on his own ground is a formidable ally. 215 00:17:09,310 --> 00:17:11,339 A man of great personal courage, 216 00:17:11,339 --> 00:17:12,900 the Montagnard holds the key 217 00:17:12,900 --> 00:17:16,520 to a strategically vital area of Southeast Asia. 218 00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:19,569 If he can be won to the government's cause, 219 00:17:19,569 --> 00:17:21,349 the guerrillas' jungle sanctuary 220 00:17:21,349 --> 00:17:24,183 in the Vietnamese highlands will disappear. 221 00:17:25,064 --> 00:17:27,160 (bombs exploding) 222 00:17:27,160 --> 00:17:30,803 - You know what is corruption under these circumstances? 223 00:17:32,960 --> 00:17:36,220 Well the district that was in the northern part of Ninh Chu 224 00:17:36,220 --> 00:17:38,750 was dominated by Montagnards 225 00:17:38,750 --> 00:17:43,380 who had a very difficult time with most of the Vietnamese, 226 00:17:43,380 --> 00:17:45,573 who treated them as second class citizens. 227 00:17:46,490 --> 00:17:50,440 They had a district chief there that we were working with 228 00:17:50,440 --> 00:17:52,793 who was ethnically Vietnamese. 229 00:17:54,470 --> 00:17:58,900 When we went up to these hamlets in that area, 230 00:17:58,900 --> 00:18:02,570 we'd be asking the Popular Force people 231 00:18:02,570 --> 00:18:06,240 how they were getting along, what they needed, et cetera, 232 00:18:06,240 --> 00:18:08,570 and they kept complaining that they were hungry, 233 00:18:08,570 --> 00:18:10,493 that they weren't getting enough rice. 234 00:18:11,930 --> 00:18:14,360 Well one of the ways that they were rewarded 235 00:18:14,360 --> 00:18:16,210 for their service was the rice 236 00:18:16,210 --> 00:18:19,090 which the United States provided. 237 00:18:19,090 --> 00:18:21,510 It would eventually go to the district chief, 238 00:18:21,510 --> 00:18:23,290 and the district chief would distribute it 239 00:18:23,290 --> 00:18:24,883 to the Popular Forces. 240 00:18:26,620 --> 00:18:29,100 We realized that the district chief 241 00:18:29,100 --> 00:18:31,760 had to be siphoning off rice, 242 00:18:31,760 --> 00:18:34,110 selling it on the black market, 243 00:18:34,110 --> 00:18:38,173 and cutting back on what he gave to the Popular Forces. 244 00:18:39,890 --> 00:18:44,033 This kind of corruption, we thought, was truly outrageous. 245 00:18:45,130 --> 00:18:48,830 And so we began what turned out to be a long campaign 246 00:18:48,830 --> 00:18:49,730 to get rid of him. 247 00:18:51,730 --> 00:18:54,550 One day my colleagues and I noticed 248 00:18:54,550 --> 00:18:57,940 that there were literally hundreds of Montagnards 249 00:18:57,940 --> 00:19:01,820 walking along the road or coming down out of the mountains, 250 00:19:01,820 --> 00:19:03,173 some of them crying. 251 00:19:04,920 --> 00:19:08,930 They said he was the best district chief they'd ever had. 252 00:19:08,930 --> 00:19:10,600 That he was the first one 253 00:19:10,600 --> 00:19:13,513 who had treated the Montagnards fairly, 254 00:19:14,400 --> 00:19:19,340 and that all in all he was the best guy they'd ever known 255 00:19:19,340 --> 00:19:21,010 among the Vietnamese. 256 00:19:21,010 --> 00:19:23,290 And here we were, the proud Americans, 257 00:19:23,290 --> 00:19:25,110 and we made sure he got out of there. 258 00:19:25,110 --> 00:19:27,520 As I said, I think I said to the colonel, 259 00:19:27,520 --> 00:19:29,470 we should've just paid him directly 260 00:19:29,470 --> 00:19:32,192 in order to keep doing what he was doing. 261 00:19:32,192 --> 00:19:34,859 (bombs falling) 262 00:19:42,901 --> 00:19:47,901 - [Dispatcher] Control one, control two. 263 00:19:48,301 --> 00:19:50,384 Control one, control two. 264 00:19:51,219 --> 00:19:53,886 (radio chatter) 265 00:19:55,150 --> 00:19:59,260 - With Phan Rang Air Base right nearby, 266 00:19:59,260 --> 00:20:03,220 we would often get calls from the Air Force pilots 267 00:20:03,220 --> 00:20:05,760 coming back to the air base who 268 00:20:05,760 --> 00:20:08,910 for some reason or another had not dropped their ordinance 269 00:20:08,910 --> 00:20:11,242 on the original targets. 270 00:20:11,242 --> 00:20:13,825 (somber music) 271 00:20:17,450 --> 00:20:21,820 And since you didn't wanna land with ordinance on board, 272 00:20:21,820 --> 00:20:25,500 they would ask us for any targets of opportunity 273 00:20:25,500 --> 00:20:28,433 that they could drop their bombs on. 274 00:20:30,301 --> 00:20:32,968 (radio chatter) 275 00:20:40,040 --> 00:20:43,150 You wound up sometimes not much more 276 00:20:43,150 --> 00:20:45,340 than picking a dot on the map 277 00:20:45,340 --> 00:20:47,993 where there might be some VC somewhere. 278 00:20:49,050 --> 00:20:51,633 (somber music) 279 00:20:59,690 --> 00:21:02,340 There was a darker side to the colonel, 280 00:21:02,340 --> 00:21:05,590 often related to his desires 281 00:21:05,590 --> 00:21:07,993 to become a higher grade officer. 282 00:21:10,360 --> 00:21:13,590 One that I remember vividly involved 283 00:21:13,590 --> 00:21:16,920 a decision that he made about defoliating 284 00:21:16,920 --> 00:21:18,783 part of a mountainside. 285 00:21:21,350 --> 00:21:26,350 Because the technology or the weapons system was available, 286 00:21:28,380 --> 00:21:30,230 the colonel thought he oughta use it. 287 00:21:38,200 --> 00:21:40,823 Where he decided to use it was in an area 288 00:21:40,823 --> 00:21:43,620 that we had only rarely been able 289 00:21:43,620 --> 00:21:46,253 to even see from our aircraft. 290 00:21:50,330 --> 00:21:52,600 The mountains were covered with clouds 291 00:21:52,600 --> 00:21:56,333 and the aircraft could not safely get into them. 292 00:22:00,480 --> 00:22:03,220 The Montagnards lived high in the mountains. 293 00:22:03,220 --> 00:22:07,700 Often they would burn off a section of the mountainside 294 00:22:07,700 --> 00:22:11,773 and then plant, and then move on to a different section. 295 00:22:15,220 --> 00:22:17,340 Now we'd had a number of reports, 296 00:22:17,340 --> 00:22:18,770 and it probably was true, 297 00:22:18,770 --> 00:22:21,250 that there was some infiltration 298 00:22:21,250 --> 00:22:24,323 of Viet Cong down through that area. 299 00:22:25,640 --> 00:22:27,800 But it tended to be an area in which 300 00:22:27,800 --> 00:22:29,943 both sides sort of left alone. 301 00:22:32,390 --> 00:22:34,310 Some of us argued that, you know, 302 00:22:34,310 --> 00:22:37,670 we'd never had any hostile fire at our aircraft 303 00:22:37,670 --> 00:22:40,123 while we were traveling in that area. 304 00:22:42,050 --> 00:22:43,740 But the colonel was insistent 305 00:22:43,740 --> 00:22:48,580 and one day we saw come into the offices 306 00:22:48,580 --> 00:22:53,580 a crew of kind of older Air Force pilots 307 00:22:53,910 --> 00:22:58,110 with fluorescent scarves around their neck 308 00:22:58,110 --> 00:23:01,900 who announced themselves as the people 309 00:23:01,900 --> 00:23:04,567 who effectively delivered Agent Orange. 310 00:23:16,190 --> 00:23:21,000 A few weeks later, our Air Force observers 311 00:23:21,000 --> 00:23:23,833 went up into the area to see what the result was. 312 00:23:27,940 --> 00:23:31,390 For the first time in our experience there 313 00:23:31,390 --> 00:23:33,140 they heard rifle shots. 314 00:23:33,140 --> 00:23:35,333 Shots at the aircraft. 315 00:23:37,030 --> 00:23:38,950 They reported that to the colonel 316 00:23:38,950 --> 00:23:40,990 at the briefing that night, 317 00:23:40,990 --> 00:23:44,130 and of course the colonel turned to me and said, 318 00:23:44,130 --> 00:23:46,393 see I told you there were VC up there. 319 00:23:47,660 --> 00:23:50,100 And I think I held my tongue, 320 00:23:50,100 --> 00:23:54,430 but later pointed out that they didn't shoot at us before 321 00:23:54,430 --> 00:23:56,990 but who wouldn't shoot at an aircraft now 322 00:23:56,990 --> 00:24:00,550 after we dumped all of this shit on them? 323 00:24:00,550 --> 00:24:02,373 And we're killing their plants? 324 00:24:04,191 --> 00:24:06,774 (somber music) 325 00:24:09,620 --> 00:24:12,580 The American advisors lived in a compound 326 00:24:12,580 --> 00:24:16,060 that was located along a main highway 327 00:24:16,060 --> 00:24:20,323 that ran between Phan Rang and the air base. 328 00:24:21,930 --> 00:24:25,340 And along the highway there was a pipeline 329 00:24:25,340 --> 00:24:26,943 to carry jet fuel. 330 00:24:28,390 --> 00:24:31,840 One Sunday afternoon, we were relaxing in our rooms 331 00:24:31,840 --> 00:24:36,840 when we heard screaming and a loud explosion. 332 00:24:39,000 --> 00:24:42,420 We saw the small huts that people lived in 333 00:24:42,420 --> 00:24:44,663 across the way in flames. 334 00:24:46,560 --> 00:24:50,060 And then dozens of people either on fire 335 00:24:50,060 --> 00:24:51,943 or running away from the fire. 336 00:24:53,830 --> 00:24:56,653 The pipeline had developed a leak. 337 00:24:57,670 --> 00:24:59,780 Either that or the native Vietnamese 338 00:24:59,780 --> 00:25:02,360 had been using some of the jet fuel 339 00:25:02,360 --> 00:25:04,633 for their own cooking purposes. 340 00:25:07,500 --> 00:25:11,470 We ran back to the compound to get blankets 341 00:25:11,470 --> 00:25:14,163 or anything we could to help put out the flames. 342 00:25:15,690 --> 00:25:17,490 I noticed one of our surgeons 343 00:25:17,490 --> 00:25:20,723 who was standing nearby but not reacting. 344 00:25:22,300 --> 00:25:25,350 I said to him, why aren't you helping? 345 00:25:25,350 --> 00:25:27,720 He showed me his hands and said 346 00:25:27,720 --> 00:25:31,600 these are hands that have been trained as a surgeon. 347 00:25:31,600 --> 00:25:35,540 I can't afford to risk them and risk my future 348 00:25:37,270 --> 00:25:39,543 in order to help these people. 349 00:25:43,411 --> 00:25:46,078 (radio chatter) 350 00:26:46,810 --> 00:26:49,930 The work of intelligence. 351 00:26:49,930 --> 00:26:52,440 There really are two components to it. 352 00:26:52,440 --> 00:26:57,313 One is to record incidents of contact with the enemy. 353 00:27:02,330 --> 00:27:06,710 We'd get reports of three VC having entered a hamlet 354 00:27:06,710 --> 00:27:10,710 and conducted an indoctrination lecture, 355 00:27:10,710 --> 00:27:13,170 and so with the help of my interpreter, 356 00:27:13,170 --> 00:27:15,198 we would interview people. 357 00:27:15,198 --> 00:27:17,531 (low music) 358 00:27:21,830 --> 00:27:24,850 There was a civilian component. 359 00:27:24,850 --> 00:27:28,430 Representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency 360 00:27:28,430 --> 00:27:32,393 that was the advisor to the National Police. 361 00:27:36,350 --> 00:27:41,040 There was the information received through American sources 362 00:27:44,710 --> 00:27:48,120 to pinpoint areas where Viet Cong 363 00:27:48,120 --> 00:27:51,143 or NVA units might be located. 364 00:27:53,096 --> 00:27:56,013 (electronic music) 365 00:28:06,090 --> 00:28:08,730 The second part was collecting information 366 00:28:08,730 --> 00:28:10,943 reported by agents. 367 00:28:14,470 --> 00:28:19,093 These created the greatest problem in terms of evaluation. 368 00:28:20,538 --> 00:28:23,455 (electronic music) 369 00:28:26,930 --> 00:28:29,500 Without knowing the agents, 370 00:28:29,500 --> 00:28:33,283 many of them would have to be classified as F, unknown. 371 00:28:35,210 --> 00:28:39,592 Most often, the information itself would be unknown. 372 00:28:39,592 --> 00:28:42,509 (electronic music) 373 00:28:52,790 --> 00:28:54,470 We'd get a report, for example, 374 00:28:54,470 --> 00:28:57,230 that an NVA battalion had moved 375 00:28:57,230 --> 00:29:00,913 through this mountainous area on its way south. 376 00:29:03,150 --> 00:29:07,170 Possible, but there was no other evidence of it. 377 00:29:07,170 --> 00:29:10,420 It was either unlikely or it was at least unknown. 378 00:29:10,420 --> 00:29:12,203 We didn't know who the agent was. 379 00:29:13,310 --> 00:29:16,520 And part of the reason we didn't know who the agent was 380 00:29:16,520 --> 00:29:19,760 was because of the Vietnamese system 381 00:29:19,760 --> 00:29:23,503 of not sharing much information about their agents. 382 00:29:29,470 --> 00:29:31,800 One of the other problems associated with this was 383 00:29:31,800 --> 00:29:36,800 that the various Vietnamese intelligence agencies 384 00:29:37,590 --> 00:29:39,470 refused to share information 385 00:29:39,470 --> 00:29:41,283 about their agent with one another. 386 00:29:46,370 --> 00:29:48,470 This really complicated our lives, 387 00:29:48,470 --> 00:29:52,370 because one of the things that you would like to have 388 00:29:52,370 --> 00:29:55,480 is to get the same or similar information 389 00:29:55,480 --> 00:29:56,830 from two different sources. 390 00:29:57,884 --> 00:30:00,801 (electronic music) 391 00:30:02,364 --> 00:30:05,140 So now we've got this NVA battalion moves 392 00:30:05,140 --> 00:30:08,460 through this area reported by one agent, 393 00:30:08,460 --> 00:30:11,633 perhaps coming through the Vietnamese military. 394 00:30:13,060 --> 00:30:16,000 And we get a report from the National Police 395 00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:19,310 that their agent had seen an NVA battalion 396 00:30:19,310 --> 00:30:21,833 coming through the area in a similar fashion. 397 00:30:23,420 --> 00:30:24,720 One would like to conclude 398 00:30:24,720 --> 00:30:26,590 that that was accurate information. 399 00:30:26,590 --> 00:30:29,490 The problem was we were never sure 400 00:30:29,490 --> 00:30:32,700 that it wasn't the same agent selling the same information 401 00:30:32,700 --> 00:30:34,503 to both of the different services. 402 00:30:35,383 --> 00:30:38,050 (ominous music) 403 00:30:45,063 --> 00:30:47,896 (bombs exploding) 404 00:30:49,850 --> 00:30:53,683 A building had been blown up in the downtown Phan Rang area. 405 00:30:54,770 --> 00:30:57,490 Two construction workers had been killed, 406 00:30:57,490 --> 00:30:59,803 Vietnamese construction workers these were. 407 00:31:01,830 --> 00:31:05,573 It evidently had been a Viet Cong operation. 408 00:31:07,250 --> 00:31:09,810 None of us could understand why 409 00:31:09,810 --> 00:31:12,080 this particular building or these people 410 00:31:12,080 --> 00:31:15,102 might have been targeted by the VC. 411 00:31:15,102 --> 00:31:17,602 (eerie music) 412 00:31:19,300 --> 00:31:23,610 We were informed that the advisors to the National Police 413 00:31:23,610 --> 00:31:27,573 would be arriving in country on Air America. 414 00:31:29,020 --> 00:31:32,413 The people who were coming were obviously CIA people. 415 00:31:33,950 --> 00:31:37,280 The Viet Cong knew that these two individuals 416 00:31:37,280 --> 00:31:41,460 were agents working for the Central Intelligence Agency, 417 00:31:41,460 --> 00:31:42,293 but we didn't. 418 00:31:43,224 --> 00:31:45,891 (ominous music) 419 00:31:49,384 --> 00:31:54,290 There had been an uproar in Washington by President Johnson, 420 00:31:54,290 --> 00:31:56,760 and he had told the CIA to send people 421 00:31:56,760 --> 00:31:59,283 and get them out there to get more information. 422 00:32:00,520 --> 00:32:05,520 My image of the CIA functionary in our province. 423 00:32:06,770 --> 00:32:08,770 I'd never seen him come out of his house, 424 00:32:08,770 --> 00:32:13,253 nevermind do anything even a little more risky. 425 00:32:16,640 --> 00:32:20,553 It did not surprise me at all that he was not calling in. 426 00:32:23,840 --> 00:32:28,713 He was notoriously a man who liked his alcohol, 427 00:32:30,330 --> 00:32:33,833 liked some of the young women from the area. 428 00:32:38,330 --> 00:32:40,550 A lot of the people who'd been assigned 429 00:32:40,550 --> 00:32:43,570 to these provincial roles 430 00:32:43,570 --> 00:32:46,680 had never been out of the office in Langley, Virginia. 431 00:32:46,680 --> 00:32:50,180 They were desk people, analytic people, 432 00:32:50,180 --> 00:32:52,440 something like that had happened to me 433 00:32:52,440 --> 00:32:55,464 in terms of being sent out into the field. 434 00:32:55,464 --> 00:33:00,464 (car horns honking) (somber music) 435 00:33:33,940 --> 00:33:36,380 We were as intelligence officers 436 00:33:36,380 --> 00:33:39,593 brought to Saigon to be briefed on the Phoenix program. 437 00:33:41,370 --> 00:33:44,220 The Phoenix program was an effort 438 00:33:44,220 --> 00:33:47,253 to try to improve, on one level, 439 00:33:48,280 --> 00:33:51,432 intelligence collection coordination. 440 00:33:51,432 --> 00:33:54,349 (electronic music) 441 00:33:56,260 --> 00:34:01,260 It also aimed at the identification of the individuals 442 00:34:01,370 --> 00:34:05,823 within the normal hamlet village operations, 443 00:34:06,800 --> 00:34:11,800 but who were secretly part of the Viet Cong apparatus. 444 00:34:13,090 --> 00:34:15,920 And the point of that identification 445 00:34:15,920 --> 00:34:20,920 was to then conduct assassinations against them. 446 00:34:23,330 --> 00:34:26,340 The program was really aimed at identification 447 00:34:26,340 --> 00:34:30,170 of individuals, ostensibly civilians, 448 00:34:30,170 --> 00:34:35,170 who would be taken out as potential leaders 449 00:34:35,230 --> 00:34:37,483 of a Viet Cong government. 450 00:34:41,030 --> 00:34:44,199 The program as it was to operate at the province level 451 00:34:44,199 --> 00:34:45,860 was with the establishment 452 00:34:45,860 --> 00:34:48,902 of an intelligence tactical operation center. 453 00:34:50,540 --> 00:34:53,060 Wherever intelligence was being collected 454 00:34:53,060 --> 00:34:56,853 from all sources would be brought together and shared. 455 00:34:58,910 --> 00:35:02,173 When we asked what the Vietnamese knew about this, 456 00:35:03,240 --> 00:35:08,240 they said that they had asked the Vietnamese commanders 457 00:35:09,390 --> 00:35:14,390 to institute these things but they had decided against it. 458 00:35:14,700 --> 00:35:18,130 And so we were supposed to persuade our colleagues 459 00:35:18,130 --> 00:35:22,430 and counterparts at the local level to do this, 460 00:35:22,430 --> 00:35:25,660 so that it would be in place and then 461 00:35:25,660 --> 00:35:28,490 the ambassador could simply tell the president 462 00:35:28,490 --> 00:35:30,223 that it now already existed. 463 00:35:32,270 --> 00:35:36,000 Well there was no way that the Vietnamese lieutenant 464 00:35:36,000 --> 00:35:40,660 was going to institute a system for sharing information 465 00:35:40,660 --> 00:35:44,290 unless he got direct orders from higher authorities, 466 00:35:44,290 --> 00:35:49,013 and so our ability to really do this was very limited. 467 00:35:50,590 --> 00:35:53,950 But the controversy about whether or not 468 00:35:53,950 --> 00:35:57,640 either an individual or that the United States military 469 00:35:57,640 --> 00:36:00,860 is justified in assassinating people 470 00:36:00,860 --> 00:36:05,800 who have not quote done anything that we know of yet 471 00:36:06,750 --> 00:36:11,290 as participants in a plot to do something 472 00:36:11,290 --> 00:36:16,290 is obviously a very difficult moral question. 473 00:36:19,007 --> 00:36:21,507 (eerie music) 474 00:36:43,400 --> 00:36:48,010 We had problems associated with the use of force 475 00:36:48,010 --> 00:36:52,253 and extracting confessions out of prisoners. 476 00:36:54,310 --> 00:36:56,600 One technique involved the use 477 00:36:56,600 --> 00:37:00,763 of the American military field telephone. 478 00:37:03,700 --> 00:37:07,340 We called it ringing somebody up. 479 00:37:07,340 --> 00:37:09,310 This field phone, 480 00:37:09,310 --> 00:37:14,123 that you generated a electrical shock by winding up, 481 00:37:15,090 --> 00:37:18,480 would be used by attaching the bare wires to, 482 00:37:18,480 --> 00:37:21,920 perhaps, a finger on one hand and a toe, 483 00:37:21,920 --> 00:37:24,700 or in some cases to genitalia, 484 00:37:24,700 --> 00:37:28,763 that depended on the mood of the operatives. 485 00:37:31,380 --> 00:37:34,220 One day I walked into an interrogation 486 00:37:34,220 --> 00:37:36,403 of a Viet Cong prisoner. 487 00:37:39,390 --> 00:37:41,450 The Vietnamese, our counterparts, 488 00:37:41,450 --> 00:37:44,150 were using this telephone as a way 489 00:37:44,150 --> 00:37:46,433 to encourage him to speak. 490 00:37:48,920 --> 00:37:51,580 We asked them not to do that, 491 00:37:51,580 --> 00:37:54,090 told them they should not do that, 492 00:37:54,090 --> 00:37:57,050 and then basically had to leave. 493 00:37:57,050 --> 00:37:59,170 They did stop for awhile while we were there, 494 00:37:59,170 --> 00:38:01,953 but I'm sure it probably continued afterwards. 495 00:38:03,860 --> 00:38:06,150 This goes along with things like 496 00:38:06,150 --> 00:38:08,800 threatening to throw people out of helicopters 497 00:38:08,800 --> 00:38:10,433 if somebody didn't talk. 498 00:38:11,680 --> 00:38:15,722 Clearly that kind of psychological threat was used. 499 00:38:15,722 --> 00:38:18,389 (ominous music) 500 00:38:29,380 --> 00:38:33,193 South Korea had sent a couple of battalions of forces. 501 00:38:34,890 --> 00:38:38,210 We didn't have much contact until one day 502 00:38:38,210 --> 00:38:43,210 we got a call that three Vietnamese woodcutters 503 00:38:43,330 --> 00:38:46,500 had been killed in an ambush 504 00:38:46,500 --> 00:38:48,870 that had been set up by the ROKs, 505 00:38:48,870 --> 00:38:51,373 the Republic of Korean soldiers. 506 00:38:53,470 --> 00:38:58,470 These were innocent people, although they were near areas 507 00:38:58,650 --> 00:39:01,673 that we considered free fire zones. 508 00:39:03,200 --> 00:39:04,680 The problem for the woodcutters was 509 00:39:04,680 --> 00:39:06,480 that was where the wood was. 510 00:39:06,480 --> 00:39:08,960 And even though they weren't supposed to go in there, 511 00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:11,210 for their livelihoods that's where they went. 512 00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:14,340 Well, early one morning, 513 00:39:14,340 --> 00:39:18,250 the Koreans had set up an ambush along a trail, 514 00:39:18,250 --> 00:39:23,250 and evidently had cut down these three woodcutters. 515 00:39:26,490 --> 00:39:29,670 Already, there had been an offer made to compensate 516 00:39:29,670 --> 00:39:33,310 the families of the woodcutters with great apologies, 517 00:39:33,310 --> 00:39:35,830 but the Vietnamese were looking 518 00:39:35,830 --> 00:39:38,633 for some other kind of compensation. 519 00:39:41,270 --> 00:39:44,453 We agreed to meet with the ROK commander. 520 00:39:46,110 --> 00:39:48,020 We approached him with the question 521 00:39:48,020 --> 00:39:51,010 of was there some other gesture 522 00:39:51,010 --> 00:39:53,903 that they thought the Koreans could make. 523 00:39:55,210 --> 00:39:58,510 The commander talked with a few of his aids 524 00:39:59,390 --> 00:40:01,670 and he came back and he said, 525 00:40:01,670 --> 00:40:04,680 would it help if we returned their ears? 526 00:40:05,557 --> 00:40:08,224 (intense music) 527 00:40:55,000 --> 00:40:59,133 This would've been in the middle part of 1967. 528 00:41:00,570 --> 00:41:04,860 The US Army sources were doing a reanalysis 529 00:41:05,751 --> 00:41:09,630 of the numbers of Viet Cong and NVA troops 530 00:41:09,630 --> 00:41:10,993 that we were confronting. 531 00:41:11,930 --> 00:41:14,270 At the same time, coming down through 532 00:41:14,270 --> 00:41:15,990 the Vietnamese chain of command, 533 00:41:15,990 --> 00:41:18,390 they were getting the same requirement. 534 00:41:18,390 --> 00:41:20,200 They were to do their analysis 535 00:41:20,200 --> 00:41:22,683 of the size of the enemy force. 536 00:41:24,770 --> 00:41:28,780 Basically an attempt to finally figure out 537 00:41:28,780 --> 00:41:32,490 not only how many Viet Cong military there were, 538 00:41:32,490 --> 00:41:34,470 but also this infrastructure, 539 00:41:34,470 --> 00:41:38,563 this parallel governmental universe that existed. 540 00:41:39,660 --> 00:41:41,930 Maybe even going down to sympathizers 541 00:41:41,930 --> 00:41:45,634 who would be part of the Viet Cong effort. 542 00:41:45,634 --> 00:41:48,301 (intense music) 543 00:42:01,460 --> 00:42:03,390 And it resulted in what came to be known 544 00:42:03,390 --> 00:42:06,010 as the corral reports. 545 00:42:06,010 --> 00:42:09,030 We were gonna round up all of the enemy 546 00:42:09,030 --> 00:42:11,692 in a corral kind of situation. 547 00:42:11,692 --> 00:42:14,359 (intense music) 548 00:42:19,870 --> 00:42:23,030 The Viet Cong had a political military structure 549 00:42:23,030 --> 00:42:25,663 that was parallel to that of the ARVN. 550 00:42:27,480 --> 00:42:31,320 They had a province chief and they had various levels 551 00:42:31,320 --> 00:42:35,060 of command that would be like the shadow government 552 00:42:35,060 --> 00:42:37,583 if and when they took over the province. 553 00:42:40,396 --> 00:42:43,063 (pulsing music) 554 00:42:49,385 --> 00:42:52,052 (intense music) 555 00:42:55,880 --> 00:43:00,200 Only a few weeks before, 101st Airborne Division 556 00:43:00,200 --> 00:43:03,990 had conducted an operation in the province 557 00:43:03,990 --> 00:43:07,670 on an area identified as the location 558 00:43:07,670 --> 00:43:11,083 of the Viet Cong's province chief. 559 00:43:15,996 --> 00:43:20,996 (bombs exploding) (guns firing) 560 00:43:22,556 --> 00:43:25,306 (dramatic music) 561 00:43:33,850 --> 00:43:37,790 We had a pile of documents that appeared to be lists 562 00:43:37,790 --> 00:43:42,053 of people and gave us some ideas about troop strength. 563 00:43:44,070 --> 00:43:47,713 The measure that was being used was body counts. 564 00:43:49,130 --> 00:43:51,500 The commanding general of the 101st Airborne 565 00:43:51,500 --> 00:43:54,700 was very disappointed in the number of bodies 566 00:43:54,700 --> 00:43:56,933 identified as Viet Cong. 567 00:43:58,220 --> 00:44:03,220 And so he questioned us, why they didn't find more VC there. 568 00:44:05,220 --> 00:44:07,560 We said something to the effect of 569 00:44:07,560 --> 00:44:09,320 what did you expect to find there? 570 00:44:09,320 --> 00:44:12,040 You found the province capital. 571 00:44:12,040 --> 00:44:14,000 And they said well we had these reports 572 00:44:14,000 --> 00:44:19,000 about NVA battalions and we said, you know, 573 00:44:19,580 --> 00:44:21,810 I think, sir, if you look at those reports 574 00:44:21,810 --> 00:44:24,260 you'll see that we consider those reports 575 00:44:24,260 --> 00:44:29,260 either doubtful or F-6 unknown, unable to classify. 576 00:44:31,020 --> 00:44:33,730 Well obviously they'd never looked at the classification. 577 00:44:33,730 --> 00:44:35,610 They never looked at that, they just read 578 00:44:35,610 --> 00:44:37,700 whatever the report was and so you learn 579 00:44:37,700 --> 00:44:39,690 that it wasn't working. 580 00:44:39,690 --> 00:44:42,676 That up the chain they were simply interested 581 00:44:42,676 --> 00:44:47,320 in the numbers and weren't paying any attention 582 00:44:47,320 --> 00:44:48,483 to the evaluation. 583 00:44:51,300 --> 00:44:53,880 Coming back to this Corral Report. 584 00:44:53,880 --> 00:44:57,680 We developed some numbers about the size 585 00:44:57,680 --> 00:45:01,219 of the Viet Cong force that operated in the province. 586 00:45:01,219 --> 00:45:03,886 (intense music) 587 00:45:10,307 --> 00:45:12,974 (pulsing music) 588 00:45:21,510 --> 00:45:24,390 A few weeks later, the colonel called us in 589 00:45:24,390 --> 00:45:27,010 and said that Saigon was not happy 590 00:45:27,010 --> 00:45:30,850 because our estimates of Viet Cong strength 591 00:45:30,850 --> 00:45:33,733 and those of the Vietnamese did not match. 592 00:45:34,700 --> 00:45:36,400 And that we should reconcile them. 593 00:45:38,870 --> 00:45:41,730 We asked what the Vietnamese had offered, 594 00:45:41,730 --> 00:45:44,090 and they had said some much lower figure 595 00:45:44,090 --> 00:45:45,590 than what we had come up with. 596 00:45:47,220 --> 00:45:49,113 He says what do you think this means. 597 00:45:50,540 --> 00:45:54,750 And I said Colonel, I don't think they want 598 00:45:54,750 --> 00:45:56,810 our higher numbers (laughs). 599 00:45:56,810 --> 00:46:00,576 I think they want the Vietnamese lower numbers. 600 00:46:00,576 --> 00:46:03,493 (electronic music) 601 00:46:11,030 --> 00:46:15,743 He finally decided to send them the Vietnamese numbers, 602 00:46:16,620 --> 00:46:20,390 afraid that he was going to alienate his superiors 603 00:46:20,390 --> 00:46:24,113 if he continued to argue the case for the higher numbers. 604 00:46:27,580 --> 00:46:31,180 A few weeks later, I met with some of my friends 605 00:46:31,180 --> 00:46:32,730 who were still at Tan Son Nhut, 606 00:46:33,840 --> 00:46:37,580 a major base known as Pentagon East, 607 00:46:37,580 --> 00:46:42,580 and they were operating there as intelligence officers: 608 00:46:42,670 --> 00:46:45,300 looking at the big map of South Vietnam 609 00:46:45,300 --> 00:46:47,840 and receiving reports from around the country, 610 00:46:47,840 --> 00:46:49,930 and making the Order of Battle, 611 00:46:49,930 --> 00:46:52,913 what units were where and how many were, et cetera. 612 00:46:54,810 --> 00:46:56,290 And they said you've gotta come over 613 00:46:56,290 --> 00:47:00,330 and see the new Order of Battle map that we've created. 614 00:47:00,330 --> 00:47:02,490 We've gotten all these corral reports 615 00:47:02,490 --> 00:47:05,270 and we now have numbers for people. 616 00:47:05,270 --> 00:47:08,483 We think we have a picture of the whole countryside. 617 00:47:12,310 --> 00:47:13,750 I had to say to them, you know, 618 00:47:13,750 --> 00:47:15,180 I think that's a wonderful map, 619 00:47:15,180 --> 00:47:17,580 you've got a nice diagram, nice set up here. 620 00:47:17,580 --> 00:47:21,130 I said there's only one problem with the map, 621 00:47:21,130 --> 00:47:23,360 we sent you those numbers and we know 622 00:47:23,360 --> 00:47:25,562 those aren't the right numbers. 623 00:47:25,562 --> 00:47:28,479 (electronic music) 624 00:47:31,550 --> 00:47:34,510 The numbers that we were talking about 625 00:47:34,510 --> 00:47:37,960 tried to be inclusive of everybody 626 00:47:37,960 --> 00:47:40,503 who might be a part of the enemy force. 627 00:47:41,890 --> 00:47:44,400 The Vietnamese were willing, perhaps, 628 00:47:44,400 --> 00:47:47,060 only to look at the numbers of people 629 00:47:47,060 --> 00:47:50,953 in the kind of official military position. 630 00:47:54,580 --> 00:47:57,890 There were different levels of commitment 631 00:47:57,890 --> 00:48:01,260 to the Viet Cong cause and it was very important 632 00:48:01,260 --> 00:48:04,250 to know whether or not there were people 633 00:48:04,250 --> 00:48:06,270 in the hamlets who were sympathetic, 634 00:48:06,270 --> 00:48:08,483 even if they weren't the military people. 635 00:48:09,370 --> 00:48:11,510 And so that was part of the disagreement 636 00:48:11,510 --> 00:48:14,023 about how to count the enemy force. 637 00:48:16,780 --> 00:48:18,820 Our position was that there were many more 638 00:48:18,820 --> 00:48:21,359 than the Vietnamese were willing to admit. 639 00:48:21,359 --> 00:48:24,276 (electronic music) 640 00:48:27,630 --> 00:48:30,450 One of our colleagues responsible 641 00:48:30,450 --> 00:48:33,403 for briefing General Westmoreland, 642 00:48:34,280 --> 00:48:36,043 the commander in the entire area, 643 00:48:39,140 --> 00:48:42,713 and Ellsworth Bunker, who was the ambassador at the time, 644 00:48:46,660 --> 00:48:48,660 he had been concerned about the fact 645 00:48:48,660 --> 00:48:50,810 that they were going to have to justify 646 00:48:50,810 --> 00:48:54,410 these much larger numbers than had been used before 647 00:48:54,410 --> 00:48:56,870 by the American military to assess 648 00:48:56,870 --> 00:48:58,183 the nature of the problem. 649 00:49:00,960 --> 00:49:03,850 Instead, he said, there was no reaction from them 650 00:49:03,850 --> 00:49:07,440 except for a discussion between the two of them 651 00:49:07,440 --> 00:49:09,210 about how they were gonna present 652 00:49:09,210 --> 00:49:10,610 these numbers to Washington. 653 00:49:13,780 --> 00:49:16,880 It was probably less the case that Westmoreland 654 00:49:16,880 --> 00:49:20,920 was fudging the numbers than it was 655 00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:22,960 that the whole bureaucratic system 656 00:49:22,960 --> 00:49:24,940 was designed to fudge the numbers 657 00:49:24,940 --> 00:49:27,258 before they got to Westmoreland. 658 00:49:27,258 --> 00:49:30,175 (electronic music) 659 00:49:55,710 --> 00:49:58,430 By telling us they didn't want the higher numbers 660 00:49:58,430 --> 00:50:00,740 that we were getting and giving them, 661 00:50:00,740 --> 00:50:02,993 they were telling us to keep them lower. 662 00:50:05,400 --> 00:50:08,050 The political atmosphere and the political leadership 663 00:50:10,110 --> 00:50:12,740 are obviously vested in a certain policy 664 00:50:15,330 --> 00:50:18,653 and they don't like the bad news being brought to them. 665 00:50:21,180 --> 00:50:25,750 So we contributed to that, we made the compromise 666 00:50:25,750 --> 00:50:30,325 of changing our numbers to meet the expectations 667 00:50:30,325 --> 00:50:33,371 of those people above us. 668 00:50:33,371 --> 00:50:35,954 (somber music) 669 00:50:52,013 --> 00:50:53,870 Virtually everybody that you saw 670 00:50:53,870 --> 00:50:56,020 could tell you what day they were on 671 00:50:56,020 --> 00:51:00,570 in terms of the 365 days that they were scheduled 672 00:51:00,570 --> 00:51:01,733 to be in country. 673 00:51:04,490 --> 00:51:08,320 You had to worry for people who were very new 674 00:51:08,320 --> 00:51:10,450 to being in country, 675 00:51:10,450 --> 00:51:13,480 but also then when you got short, 676 00:51:13,480 --> 00:51:16,653 when you were only a month or so away from leaving. 677 00:51:18,440 --> 00:51:21,693 One of our observer pilots, 678 00:51:22,920 --> 00:51:25,493 who also was getting ready to return home, 679 00:51:26,770 --> 00:51:31,680 was on a reconnaissance mission and saw a truck 680 00:51:31,680 --> 00:51:36,173 driving up into Viet Cong controlled area. 681 00:51:38,700 --> 00:51:42,253 He fired off his M60 machine gun, 682 00:51:43,280 --> 00:51:47,380 planning to strafe alongside of the road 683 00:51:47,380 --> 00:51:50,333 as a warning to frighten the driver. 684 00:51:51,680 --> 00:51:54,503 The rounds strafe the truck itself. 685 00:51:55,950 --> 00:51:58,430 The driver fell out of the truck 686 00:51:58,430 --> 00:52:00,843 and turned out to be killed. 687 00:52:01,760 --> 00:52:03,813 Something that he didn't mean to do. 688 00:52:06,200 --> 00:52:11,200 In this war zone, you felt you ought to be doing something 689 00:52:11,540 --> 00:52:16,150 that would make a mark as part of that war effort, 690 00:52:16,150 --> 00:52:21,150 and it was a dangerous kind of psychology that took over. 691 00:52:21,530 --> 00:52:24,290 And I felt that this guy in some ways had had that. 692 00:52:24,290 --> 00:52:29,290 He hadn't had any real confrontation with the enemy. 693 00:52:34,080 --> 00:52:37,423 There would've been the possibility of an investigation. 694 00:52:39,380 --> 00:52:44,250 As it was, we were able to construct a reasonable case 695 00:52:44,250 --> 00:52:46,430 that this individual had to be either 696 00:52:46,430 --> 00:52:49,210 dealing with the Viet Cong, paying the Viet Cong, 697 00:52:49,210 --> 00:52:51,420 or in some way cooperating with them 698 00:52:51,420 --> 00:52:53,820 in order to be in that area. 699 00:52:53,820 --> 00:52:58,003 And as far as I know that's as far as that went. 700 00:53:01,750 --> 00:53:06,750 Well, you know, had some moral twinges about it, 701 00:53:07,770 --> 00:53:09,883 especially in retrospect. 702 00:53:11,950 --> 00:53:15,470 The government of Vietnam and of the United States 703 00:53:15,470 --> 00:53:19,413 offered its apologies, there was compensation paid, 704 00:53:21,543 --> 00:53:26,250 and I often wonder how that individual feels 705 00:53:26,250 --> 00:53:30,250 about the episode, whether that continues to be a thought. 706 00:53:30,250 --> 00:53:32,550 But I know at the time it was something 707 00:53:32,550 --> 00:53:36,952 that had really bothered him a great deal. 708 00:53:36,952 --> 00:53:39,535 (somber music) 709 00:53:41,770 --> 00:53:44,770 (helicopter flying) 710 00:53:51,331 --> 00:53:53,914 (somber music) 711 00:54:22,680 --> 00:54:25,670 The American military went through a very elaborate 712 00:54:25,670 --> 00:54:29,350 set of codes for identifying people, 713 00:54:29,350 --> 00:54:32,743 you know, that it would be a mistake to use real names. 714 00:54:34,250 --> 00:54:38,523 I was known as Silver Lightning Alpha Two. 715 00:54:41,060 --> 00:54:43,820 So we're out in this little operation in this hamlet, 716 00:54:43,820 --> 00:54:48,520 and I get a radio call to Silver Lightning Two Alpha 717 00:54:48,520 --> 00:54:53,400 that your son, John Jay Murphy, has been born (laughs). 718 00:54:53,400 --> 00:54:56,740 Which of course broke all code violations and the like, 719 00:54:56,740 --> 00:55:00,470 but I remember spending the rest of that day 720 00:55:00,470 --> 00:55:03,880 taking pictures of children just trying to imagine, 721 00:55:03,880 --> 00:55:06,610 you know, what my new son looked like. 722 00:55:06,610 --> 00:55:09,693 (light guitar music) 723 00:55:37,425 --> 00:55:40,758 (acoustic guitar music) 724 00:55:42,220 --> 00:55:45,350 Each month there would be a junior officer 725 00:55:45,350 --> 00:55:48,060 from one of the teams who would be assigned 726 00:55:48,060 --> 00:55:53,060 to go to Saigon to pick up a satchel full of money, 727 00:55:53,710 --> 00:55:56,260 both military payment certificates 728 00:55:56,260 --> 00:55:59,800 which was the American currency, 729 00:55:59,800 --> 00:56:03,933 and a thick book of official papers. 730 00:56:10,480 --> 00:56:13,843 I wound up having to do what we call the pay run. 731 00:56:19,200 --> 00:56:22,390 We had to fly out to an advisory team 732 00:56:22,390 --> 00:56:24,950 that was experiencing attacks 733 00:56:24,950 --> 00:56:28,703 by a North Vietnamese battalion virtually every night. 734 00:56:31,410 --> 00:56:34,040 Needless to say, I was particularly interested 735 00:56:34,040 --> 00:56:36,780 in getting to them early in the day 736 00:56:36,780 --> 00:56:40,299 and leaving before nightfall. 737 00:56:40,299 --> 00:56:43,632 (acoustic guitar music) 738 00:56:51,590 --> 00:56:53,450 It took us awhile to figure out 739 00:56:53,450 --> 00:56:56,270 where their landing area was. 740 00:56:56,270 --> 00:56:59,113 And it turned out to be on the side of a hill. 741 00:57:03,580 --> 00:57:06,383 Landing was no real problem. 742 00:57:08,000 --> 00:57:10,640 I paid the people that were there, 743 00:57:10,640 --> 00:57:12,783 and we got ready to take off. 744 00:57:13,850 --> 00:57:16,730 The pilot was not as big or as heavy as me, 745 00:57:16,730 --> 00:57:19,560 but heavier than some of the others. 746 00:57:19,560 --> 00:57:21,980 So together we had quite a bit of weight 747 00:57:21,980 --> 00:57:25,110 with the machine guns, the rockets, the lead, 748 00:57:25,110 --> 00:57:26,993 and this little single engine. 749 00:57:28,210 --> 00:57:30,660 We sat at the top of the hill and he said, 750 00:57:30,660 --> 00:57:32,990 I don't think we've got enough engine power 751 00:57:32,990 --> 00:57:36,040 to go up the hill and get enough air speed. 752 00:57:36,040 --> 00:57:37,790 So we're gonna have to go downhill. 753 00:57:38,845 --> 00:57:42,980 And we came down the hill, building up airspeed, 754 00:57:42,980 --> 00:57:45,253 I felt us leave the ground. 755 00:57:46,760 --> 00:57:49,244 We started to hear pop, pop, pop. 756 00:57:49,244 --> 00:57:51,280 (guns firing) The pilot noticed 757 00:57:51,280 --> 00:57:52,723 that he was losing fuel. 758 00:57:53,850 --> 00:57:56,853 We had taken a couple of rounds in the fuel tank. 759 00:57:58,430 --> 00:58:01,213 And then we began to come down again. 760 00:58:02,360 --> 00:58:05,363 We come back down right at the foot of the hill, 761 00:58:06,440 --> 00:58:08,750 bounced up in the air, 762 00:58:08,750 --> 00:58:11,580 bounced back down on the other side of the hill, 763 00:58:11,580 --> 00:58:15,853 and go plowing into this grassy area. 764 00:58:17,470 --> 00:58:21,070 The pilot shouts to get out and as I do, 765 00:58:21,070 --> 00:58:22,610 I look over and I notice 766 00:58:22,610 --> 00:58:26,253 that the fuel in the wing is dripping. 767 00:58:27,530 --> 00:58:29,740 I try to climb out, I'm in the back seat 768 00:58:29,740 --> 00:58:32,780 of a two seat plane here, 769 00:58:32,780 --> 00:58:37,750 but got suck between the front seat and the doorway. 770 00:58:37,750 --> 00:58:41,670 Had to back out and then literally dove 771 00:58:41,670 --> 00:58:46,370 over the front seat out the door, 772 00:58:46,370 --> 00:58:49,173 rolled on the ground away from the plane, 773 00:58:50,280 --> 00:58:54,350 and as we stood there looking at the plane 774 00:58:54,350 --> 00:58:57,040 waiting to see if it's gonna go up in flames, 775 00:58:57,040 --> 00:58:59,330 I remember that I probably have about 776 00:58:59,330 --> 00:59:03,420 20,000 dollars in military payment certificates 777 00:59:03,420 --> 00:59:06,140 and pee-as-toos still in the plane 778 00:59:06,140 --> 00:59:09,680 and the army is awful if you lose the money 779 00:59:09,680 --> 00:59:10,710 on these pay runs. 780 00:59:10,710 --> 00:59:12,530 We've been warned over and over again. 781 00:59:12,530 --> 00:59:14,800 I can just see it burning up and having 782 00:59:14,800 --> 00:59:19,283 to try to explain that this money burned away. 783 00:59:21,070 --> 00:59:24,350 I was able to go back and retrieve the bag 784 00:59:25,300 --> 00:59:27,503 and then it occurs to me, 785 00:59:28,580 --> 00:59:32,770 I may have to stay in this place this night 786 00:59:32,770 --> 00:59:35,990 because that NVA battalion is still out there. 787 00:59:35,990 --> 00:59:37,710 How am I gonna get out of here now 788 00:59:37,710 --> 00:59:40,383 that our plane is unable to fly? 789 00:59:41,920 --> 00:59:46,090 So we immediately begin calling for help, 790 00:59:46,090 --> 00:59:48,780 but now they have to fly another plane out 791 00:59:48,780 --> 00:59:51,160 with another pilot to get me, 792 00:59:51,160 --> 00:59:53,523 and I have to complete the pay run. 793 00:59:55,340 --> 00:59:59,856 I complete the pay run and I go back to Saigon. 794 00:59:59,856 --> 01:00:02,439 (guitar music) 795 01:00:03,530 --> 01:00:05,730 One of the buildings that's been taken over 796 01:00:05,730 --> 01:00:09,210 in downtown Saigon is the headquarters 797 01:00:09,210 --> 01:00:12,583 of the finance branch of the Army. 798 01:00:14,530 --> 01:00:17,950 I go to turn in the money that I have left 799 01:00:17,950 --> 01:00:21,903 and the signed slips for people who've collected it. 800 01:00:24,820 --> 01:00:26,860 I get to the office in the morning, 801 01:00:26,860 --> 01:00:28,913 we get the bag, the money is in it, 802 01:00:29,970 --> 01:00:32,790 take it to the sergeant who's responsible 803 01:00:32,790 --> 01:00:34,563 for checking the signatures, 804 01:00:35,620 --> 01:00:39,490 and he stops at one point, oh, he says, we've got a problem. 805 01:00:39,490 --> 01:00:41,810 I said what's the problem? 806 01:00:41,810 --> 01:00:44,890 He said you see here, the official signature 807 01:00:44,890 --> 01:00:49,853 for this sergeant is John J Jones. 808 01:00:50,900 --> 01:00:54,140 He signed it J James Jones. 809 01:00:54,140 --> 01:00:56,590 That's an incorrect signature, I can't accept it. 810 01:00:57,781 --> 01:00:59,090 Can't accept it. 811 01:00:59,090 --> 01:01:00,950 He says you can't turn in the money, 812 01:01:00,950 --> 01:01:03,500 you can't turn in the pay slips, 813 01:01:03,500 --> 01:01:05,950 you've gotta go back and get the right signature. 814 01:01:08,980 --> 01:01:11,550 That would've been bad enough except 815 01:01:11,550 --> 01:01:15,720 when I look at JJ Jones or whatever his name was 816 01:01:15,720 --> 01:01:18,570 he's at this outpost where we crashed the plane (laughs). 817 01:01:19,820 --> 01:01:23,640 And so theoretically I'm supposed to go back 818 01:01:23,640 --> 01:01:26,083 and get a new signature from this guy. 819 01:01:28,090 --> 01:01:29,520 I said you gotta be kidding me. 820 01:01:29,520 --> 01:01:30,920 I said this is ridiculous. 821 01:01:30,920 --> 01:01:34,490 I said I'm gonna just, no, he says you can't do that. 822 01:01:34,490 --> 01:01:37,297 You can't just sign it yourself you know (laughs) 823 01:01:37,297 --> 01:01:38,597 we'd really be in trouble. 824 01:01:39,577 --> 01:01:42,825 So, so I have to take everything back. 825 01:01:42,825 --> 01:01:45,870 I get together with my pilot. 826 01:01:45,870 --> 01:01:48,860 I'll tell you one thing he said, that's gonna happen 827 01:01:48,860 --> 01:01:51,637 is no way am I going back in there with you 828 01:01:51,637 --> 01:01:53,400 (laughs) in the plane. 829 01:01:53,400 --> 01:01:55,690 He says give me the stuff, I'll go. 830 01:01:55,690 --> 01:01:58,180 I'll fly in there, I'll get the signature, 831 01:01:58,180 --> 01:02:00,047 and that was fine with me (laughs). 832 01:02:01,036 --> 01:02:03,453 (rock music) 833 01:02:20,562 --> 01:02:22,562 So we entered this room. 834 01:02:23,660 --> 01:02:27,620 Around the table were perhaps a dozen visitors, 835 01:02:27,620 --> 01:02:29,283 most of them military, 836 01:02:30,570 --> 01:02:33,100 mentioning that I had recently 837 01:02:33,100 --> 01:02:36,453 been an advisor at the province level in South Vietnam. 838 01:02:37,420 --> 01:02:39,510 People stopped and looked at me 839 01:02:39,510 --> 01:02:42,600 and one said I've always wondered 840 01:02:42,600 --> 01:02:45,037 what happens at the province level. 841 01:02:45,037 --> 01:02:46,810 (guns firing) 842 01:02:46,810 --> 01:02:51,160 In walked the man we had evidently been waiting for 843 01:02:51,160 --> 01:02:54,050 who was disheveled, although he wore 844 01:02:54,050 --> 01:02:56,859 a very preppy, blue, pinstriped suit. 845 01:02:56,859 --> 01:03:00,380 (rock music) (guns firing) 846 01:03:00,380 --> 01:03:04,460 He sat down at the table, put his head in his hands, 847 01:03:04,460 --> 01:03:06,850 rubbed his eyes a bit and said, 848 01:03:06,850 --> 01:03:08,760 you'll have to excuse me I've been up 849 01:03:08,760 --> 01:03:10,840 in the war room all night. 850 01:03:10,840 --> 01:03:13,430 The president wants to know what's going on. 851 01:03:13,430 --> 01:03:16,063 Somebody said to him well what's the latest news. 852 01:03:17,530 --> 01:03:21,200 And he looked at him and he said, we don't know. 853 01:03:21,200 --> 01:03:22,880 We just don't know. 854 01:03:22,880 --> 01:03:26,050 None of our people are reporting in. 855 01:03:26,050 --> 01:03:29,713 This news that not even the CIA knew what was happening, 856 01:03:30,590 --> 01:03:32,710 we had probably gotten more reports 857 01:03:32,710 --> 01:03:36,021 through the military channels than they were getting. 858 01:03:36,021 --> 01:03:38,688 (ominous music) 859 01:04:11,110 --> 01:04:15,050 There's no doubt in my mind that in the short run 860 01:04:15,970 --> 01:04:19,090 the United States could've won quote 861 01:04:19,090 --> 01:04:23,383 the war in Vietnam by taking it over and running it. 862 01:04:24,860 --> 01:04:27,210 To do that, however, they would've had 863 01:04:27,210 --> 01:04:30,307 to have become the colonial rulers, 864 01:04:30,307 --> 01:04:33,333 and in the long run we could never win at that. 865 01:04:34,570 --> 01:04:37,190 We had in many ways a connection 866 01:04:37,190 --> 01:04:39,400 with some of the population, 867 01:04:39,400 --> 01:04:43,840 which saw us as a useful and positive force, 868 01:04:43,840 --> 01:04:45,570 but who also had to deal 869 01:04:45,570 --> 01:04:48,913 with this kinda corrupt, or inefficient, leadership. 870 01:04:52,280 --> 01:04:57,280 Someone once asked me is what we hear about Vietnam true. 871 01:04:57,940 --> 01:05:00,900 And my answer used to be everything you ever heard 872 01:05:00,900 --> 01:05:03,363 about Vietnam is true in some way. 873 01:05:04,340 --> 01:05:07,660 None of us had the same experience, 874 01:05:07,660 --> 01:05:12,543 none of us went through exactly the same kinds of learning, 875 01:05:14,380 --> 01:05:17,120 but that's been the Vietnam that I knew 876 01:05:17,120 --> 01:05:20,785 and the stories that I tell. 877 01:05:20,785 --> 01:05:23,368 (somber music)